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Abstract 
 
Dissertation Title: The influence of Doing Business’ institutional variables in Foreign 
Direct Investment 
 
Author: Andreia Olival 
 
The growing importance of institutions as a determinant of inward FDI has sparked interest 
in determining their relationship. In the present study, we intended to explore the 
relationship between the institutional variables of the Doing Business report and inward 
FDI. The main question is whether Doing Business indicators explain worldwide 
differences in FDI. Doing Business is an international report that describes the business 
environment in various countries, through quantitative and qualitative indicators of the 
functioning of representative institutions. Our analysis covers 33 advanced economies and 
144 developing countries for the 2004-2009 periods. The major implication is that in 
general, a better rated business environment is more likely to attract greater amounts of 
FDI, especially in case of developing countries. Moreover institutional areas that are most 
likely to influence inward FDI are: starting a business, registering a property and trading 
across borders.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Institutional determinants, Doing Business. 
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Sumário Executivo 
 
Título da Dissertação: A influência das variáveis institucionais do Doing Business no 
Investimento Directo Estrangeiro 
 
Autor: Andreia Olival 
 
A crescente importância das instituições como factor da captação de IDE tem suscitado 
interesse na determinação da sua relação. No caso da presente análise, a relação que se 
pretende explorar é entre as variáveis institucionais do relatório Doing Business e o IDE 
realizado no interior de cada país. A principal questão é se o Doing Business explica as 
diferenças mundiais de IDE. O Doing Business é um relatório internacional que descreve o 
ambiente empresarial de diversos países, através de indicadores quantitativos e qualitativos 
representativos do funcionamento das instituições. A análise abrange 33 países 
desenvolvidos e 144 países em desenvolvimento para o período de 2004 a 2009. A grande 
conclusão é que, em geral, um país classificado de um melhor ambiente empresarial está 
mais susceptível de atrair maiores montantes de IDE, especialmente no caso dos países em 
vias de desenvolvimento. Além disso, as áreas institucionais que mais influenciam o 
montante de IDE são: abrir uma empresa, registar um imóvel e comércio com o exterior.  
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Investimento Directo Estrangeiro, determinantes institucionais, Doing 
Business. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article analyzes the role of Doing Business
1
 indicators in inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), for the 2004-2009 period. These indicators are indicative of the level 
of institutions’ quality of a country. These indicators are divided in eleven areas, namely 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting 
credit, strength of investor protection, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts, closing a business (or resolving insolvency), employing workers and getting 
electricity. Due to data availability, this study does not consider these two latter areas. 
FDI has assumed an important role in income growth, employment, modernization and 
economic development of a country (OECD 2002). A large number of studies have 
demonstrated indication of a strong positive correlation between FDI and growth of 
GDP per capita (Mariam Khawar, 2005). The great importance of FDI justifies the 
continuing research work. The common trend of all research has been the demand of the 
determinants affecting FDI. In our work, the focus is on institutional determinants.  
The International Monetary Fund
2
 defines 
 
FDI as a category of international investment that reflects the objective 
of a resident in one economy (the direct investor) obtaining a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in another economy (the direct 
investment enterprise). The lasting interest implies the existence of a 
long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct 
investment enterprise, and a significant degree of influence by the 
investor on the management of the enterprise. A direct investment 
relationship is established when the direct investor has acquired 10 per 
cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an enterprise 
abroad.  
 
  
                                                          
1
 The international report of Doing Business is explained in section 1.2 and the respective variables in the 
appendix 1. 
2
 FMI, Foreign Direct Investment - Trends, Data Availability, Concepts, and Recording Practices (2004), 
p.3 
2 
 
Statistics show that FDI's contribution to GDP has been increasing over the years 
(Figure 1). Countries show a general trend of positive growth, reaching a peak in 2007. 
Transition countries reach the highest peak at about 40%, however, they suffered a 
strong decrease, of about 20%, in 2008. Developed countries display exactly the same 
trend in terms of contribution of FDI to GDP. This group of countries has the highest 
weight in terms of inward FDI in the entire world (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1: Inward Foreign Direct Investment stock as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (1980-2009). 
Source: UNCTAD 
Figure 2: Inward Foreign Direct Investment stock as percentage of world (1980, 1990, 
2000 and 2008). Source: UNCTAD 
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The growing importance of FDI in the countries’ economy justifies an analysis of costs and 
benefits of such investment. In this sense, multinationals can not only maximize the 
benefits, but especially minimize the costs. FDI contributes to higher economic growth 
through a range of benefits at various levels. These benefits are connected to technology 
transfers, improved use of its resources, introduction of new processes, learning-by-
observing allowing human capital enhancement, international trade integration and 
enterprise development. In other words, FDI creates a more competitive business 
environment (OECD, 2002). Besides these benefits, the host country can still try to 
improve their business environment through policies to attract FDI inflows. According to 
Lougani and Razin (2001) and Feldstein (2000) the presence of foreign firms leads host 
country to take more rational policies and to contribute to the smooth function of 
institutions. 
However in view of Oman (2000), this attempt to improve the business environment in 
order to increase competitiveness may bring adverse effects. Actually a multinational 
firm’s decision to invest in another country is determined by lower costs and higher 
efficiency considerations (Alfaro, Chanda, Ozcan and Sayek, 2004), so host countries tend 
to implement policies that contradict some environmental protocols and labor rights. These 
effects of competition in view of Oman (2000) are one of the potential negative effects of 
the presence of foreign investment. The repatriation of profits, the absence of positive 
linkages with local communities and the loss of political sovereignty are other of the 
potential costs of FDI (OECD, 2002). 
The big question relates to whether FDI produces growth effects on host countries. In fact, 
the literature has shown that a host country only benefits from FDI, and more specifically 
from growth effects, under certain conditions. According to Alfaro, Chanda, Ozcan and 
Sayek (2004), the existence of well-developed financial markets are crucial to profit from 
growth effects. However, the literature suggests that a minimum threshold stock of human 
capital is also necessary (Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee, 1997). On the other hand, the 
host country cannot fully benefit from the positive effects of FDI, given the crowding out 
effect of domestic investment. 
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1.1. Institutions 
 
The importance of institutions in the society began to be more prominent by one of the 
major and earliest contributors to Institutional Economics, North. According to North 
(1991, p. 97), institutions can be understood as he described: 
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). 
Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings to 
create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Together with the 
standard constraints of economics they define the choice set and 
therefore determine transaction and production costs and hence the 
profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity. They evolve 
incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; 
history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in 
which the historical performance of economies can only be understood 
as a part of a sequential story. 
 
In order to better understand the importance of institutions in society, it makes sense to 
first determine exactly what their role is. In accordance with the World Development 
Report 2002, institutions have three pillars of action. They are a means of transmitting 
information about market conditions, goods and agents; a way of facilitate or 
impediment of competition in markets; and moreover define and enforce property rights 
and contracts. 
North argues that the main function of institutions in a society is to reduce the 
uncertainty in the sense of defining the rules of the game and, more important 
determines the security of property rights (North, 1990). In economic terms is crucial 
guarantee the property rights, in the sense that no individual or any firm will appreciate 
the rights (income, contractual obligations and other usufruct) over the assets but the 
person or company legally owns those property rights.  
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The economic significance of institutions in a society has been the subject of many 
investigations. In general has been shown a positive relationship between institutions 
and economic growth.  
By contraposition, a society where there is political instability, derived from 
revolutions, coups and political assassinations, property rights are not secured, creating 
a climate of uncertainty, which is not conducive to private investment and in turn to 
economic growth (Barro, 1991). Political reform must go through the political 
institutions in order to reduce political instability and polarization in developing 
countries, which also have impact on the quality of property rights (Svensson, 1998). 
The quality of property rights is crucial in the way that their security determines the 
magnitude of investment and even more important the efficiency with which resources 
are allocated (Knack and Keefer, 1995). According to Mauro (1995), the functioning of 
the institutions, that is the level of bureaucracy and corruption, is as important in 
determining investment and growth as the level of political instability. So a society 
where the bureaucracy and corruption are reduced shows higher levels of investment 
and growth. 
More recent authors also demonstrate that a country with a healthy functioning of its 
institutions reveals a greater attraction for investment. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
p.1, find that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic 
growth, investment, and financial development. 
 
1.2. Doing Business Report 
 
The Doing Business report is an international report sponsored by the World Bank. It aims 
to provide an objective and comparative basis for understanding and improving the 
business environment. 
The analysis reports to eleven areas of regulation - starting a business, dealing with 
construction permits, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, enforcing contracts, closing a business, employing workers and 
getting electricity. These areas are composed by several indicators which provide a 
quantitative measure of the degree of bureaucracy in a country in various areas.  
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However, they do not cover some aspects of business regulation such as, measure security, 
macroeconomic stability, corruption, labor skills of the population, specific regulation to 
foreign investment or quality of infrastructure. In the present analysis only 9 areas of the 
Doing Business report are analysed, given the availability of information. Which are 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a 
business. Therefore 33 variables are used. In appendix 1 we present their definitions and 
explain how the original variables were converted into indexes. The use of indices allows a 
better comparison of the levels among countries and among the institutional areas. 
Moreover, the conversion allowed to aggregate information from various variables relating 
to an area in a single index. And finally, allowed to summarize information from various 
institutional areas in a single index that we called global. 
Doing Business indicators are built on standardized definition of scenarios. Moreover, the 
fact that it reports to five consecutive years for the same set of countries and indicators 
allow us to understand the evolution of regulatory business environment. 
The diverse and comprehensive set of indicators that the Doing Business report is 
constituted, is of great useful by research. Many working papers and articles, use databases 
that contain indicators of this international report. Among some of the findings, the most 
relevant according to About Doing Business: measuring for impact
3
,  
 
- Lower barriers to start-up are associated with a smaller informal sector4. 
- Lower costs of entry encourage entrepreneurship, enhance firm productivity and 
reduce corruption
5
. 
- Simpler start-up translates into greater employment opportunities6. 
- The quality of a country’s contracting environment is a source of comparative 
advantage in trade patterns. Countries with good contract enforcement specialize in 
industries where relationship-specific investments are most important
7
. 
  
                                                          
3
 Site of Doing Business, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
4
 For example, Masatlioglu and Rigolini (2008), Kaplan, Piedra and Seira (2007), Ardagna and Lusardi 
(2009) and Djankov (2009b). 
5
 For example, Alesina and others (2005), Perotti and Volpin (2004), Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006), 
Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004), Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007), Barseghyan (2008), Djankov and 
others (2010) and Klapper, Lewin and Quesada Delgado (2009). 
6
 For example, Freund and Bolaky (2008), Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2009) and Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubinstein (2008). 
7
 Nunn (2007). 
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- Greater information sharing through credit bureaus is associated with higher bank 
profitability and lower bank risk
8
. 
 
Doing Business is a fundamental instrument in evaluating the business environment of a 
country. The great diversity of areas covered by the indicators of regulation and the 
enormity of countries of different levels of wealth allows the comparability of different 
business environments. It permits to establish a relationship between indicators of business 
environment and levels of economic growth, as well as between the levels of bureaucracy 
and the poverty, corruption, employment, access to credit and ease of establishing 
business. In turn, allows identifying the best practices in the countries better ranked that is 
where it is easier to do business. Finally, give the possibility to define a strategy of 
reforming the business environment, i.e. the functioning of institutions. Doing Business 
corresponds to an international instrument on "behavior change" not only to motivate 
national investors but to attract foreign investors too. 
The current importance that FDI has to economic growth of a country sustains an interest 
in reviewing the quality of institutional business environment. Doing Business emerges as 
a tool to assist with this review. However, there are no empirical studies that establish a 
relationship between FDI and the indicators of this international report. Indeed, the Doing 
Business indicators have been used in the context of investigations into the FDI, but are 
still very few studies. For examples in areas of legal system (Djankov et al, 2002), 
regulation of entry of firms (Djankov, 2009) and investors protection (Djankov et al., 
2008). In addition, none of these studies employed all the indicators of different areas to 
explain a question about the FDI. The areas that most interest raised by the existing studies 
were the regulation of entry and regulation of work.  
It makes economic sense that when a country is well ranked in the Doing Business, it is 
able to attract larger amounts of FDI. But empirically expected relationships do not exist to 
substantiate this idea. In practice, many countries are using this report as a signal of their 
attractiveness to foreign and domestic investment. But are they using it correctly? Are all 
areas that make up significant to investment explanation? In other words, regulatory 
reform of business environment should go through all the areas to be competitive? What 
are the priority areas to take action?  
  
                                                          
8
 Houston and others (2010). 
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These are some of the issues that raise the need for an econometric study, in looking for 
determination of the statistical significance of each indicator and each area of regulation in 
determining FDI. 
 
1.3. Paper Organization 
 
Section 2 provides the theoretical and empirical literature review of the importance of the 
institutions on FDI. 
Section 3 describes the model and dataset used in this thesis. Also sets out the estimation 
procedure and the results obtained.  
Section 4 describes the policy implications based on the results obtained in the previous 
section. 
Section 5 concludes, presents some policy implications, presents some limitations of this 
study and suggests new questions for future research in this area. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
To understand the importance of institutional determinants for FDI requires a waiver of its 
evolution at theory and empirical levels, allowing a better foundation of this study. 
 
2.1. Theoretical review 
 
Establishing a relationship between the quality of institutions of a country and its volume 
of FDI requires a theoretical foundation behind based on two issues. On the one hand the 
existence of factors that determine the investment incentive, and more specifically the 
investment abroad. On the other hand the theoretical verification that FDI determinants, 
particularly institutional ones, have influence on the economy. The first question is 
answered by Dunning’s OLI paradigm or the Eclectic paradigm, while the second question 
is clarified by North.  
The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production of John Dunning (1993 and 2000) 
appears as a statement of reasons for becoming a multinational company. According to this 
theory, the propensity for a company focusing on international production is explained by 
the verification of three important conditions. The first and foremost condition that 
determines the decision to become a multinational company is the ownership advantage, 
which is the possession of certain assets that naturally exist in his country but that other 
companies in other countries do not have access. Verification of this condition means that 
the additional costs adjacent to the company's expansion to another country are more than 
offset by the privileged possession of these assets, compared to the host country of 
investment. The second and third conditions follow the verification of the first condition. If 
a company has ownership-specific advantages, should maintain the respective right to use 
only among its subsidiaries and never sell them to other competitors, much less to foreign 
companies. Thus, the company holding the ownership advantage is creating another 
condition or other advantage to become multinational, Dunning called internalization 
advantage or I advantages. Finally, if the company seek to benefit from a specific point of 
the country it is located, the locational advantage or L Advantage, a combination will be 
doing more profitable (Dunning, 1987). The eclectic paradigm is one of the theoretical 
models used to support the determinants of FDI. However, their use raises some criticism. 
The enormous amount of explanatory variables used in the model that reduces its own 
10 
 
explanatory power, the interdependence between the variables OLI, OLI paradigm as an 
approach to static comparative and the fact that I advantage and the eclectic paradigm are 
explaining the same phenomenon. Following criticism are attempts to reconfigure or 
extend the model of Dunning. The Investment Development Path (IDP) is one of the first 
applications of the OLI paradigm. This extension examines how the evolution of the set of 
comparative advantages has influence in the development stage of a country, and in turn on 
investment. Another application is to face FDI as an additional competitive advantage, 
which is the acquisition of new technological and market knowledge arising from the 
relationship abroad. A third application adds that hold the ownership advantage is not just 
the privileged possession of certain resources, but also the ability to influence price, quality 
and innovation on assets. Finally, an extension of the OLI paradigm uses the theory of 
comparative advantage to explain trade patterns (Dunning, 2001). 
 
The theory of institutions from North clarifies how institutions influence the performance 
of the economy and also the FDI. North starts with the theory of human behavior and 
combines it with the theory of transaction costs, concluding the importance of institutions 
in the functioning of societies. Finally, adding the theory of production he can clarify the 
role of institutions in economic performance. With regard to the theory of human behavior, 
the asymmetry of information about the behavior of both parties in a process of exchange, 
triggers uncertainty about the proper observance of the rights and duties adjacent to each 
other. In order to reduce uncertainty, institutions arise, formally and informally, to ensure 
the proper functioning of the exchange process. According to North (1990, p.27), “the 
costliness of information is the key to the costs of transacting, which consist of the costs of 
measuring the attributes of what is valuable being exchanged and the costs of protecting 
rights and policing and enforcing agreements”. Thus, transaction costs reflect the degree 
of uncertainty that exists, or otherwise the share of institutions in society, by including a 
risk premium. The risk premium will be greater, the lower the ability of a society to ensure 
the enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights. Institutions affect the total 
production costs, by transaction costs as much as the transformation costs. Transformation 
costs of inputs of land, labour, capital and goods and services, in a production process can 
be affected by the quality of institutions. The quality of institutions determines the 
application of contracts, the enforceability of rights and duties, measurement and 
uncertainty in the markets. Therefore determines the efficiency of production by the 
quality of inputs provided, the amount of inputs required, the time to affect, among other 
11 
 
aspects of the production process. This is how North argues the effect of institutions on 
transformation costs. According to North (1990), the weight of institutions in production 
costs affects profits, and as such the country's attractiveness for foreign investment (FDI 
inflows). The consequences on the quality of institutions may go much beyond influencing 
production costs. Henisz and Williamson (1999) and Henisz (2000) argue that the lack of 
protection of property rights in a country may lead to expropriation risk, direct hazard 
(nationalization of the company) or indirect hazard (favoritism by the government). 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence review 
 
The nineties were signaled by the intensified flows of FDI, also accompanied by an 
increased interest of developing countries in attracting greater flows. The need of a country 
to become more competitive triggered a demand for the most important factors in deciding 
the investment location. Studies have begun to demonstrate that foreign investors were 
taking greater account on the business environment of a country, which is its institutional 
quality, than the arrest of "natural assets" (Bevan, Estrin et al. 2004). The North’s study 
(1990) comes in that sense too, showing the importance of institutions on economic 
performance. His research work marked the big push for the remaining studies in this area. 
Although there is strong evidence that a good institutional environment is more attractive 
to FDI, the empirical results are unclear and even controversial (Lim, 2001). Blonigen 
(2005) concludes that the mixed results stem from conceptual problems, measures and 
methods used. Estimating magnitude of the effect of institutions on FDI is difficult because 
there are not any accurate measurements of institutions (Blonigen, 2005, p. 390).  
A summary of what has been discovered in recent empirical studies is essential for the 
understanding of all potential determinants of FDI. Specifically in order to identify the 
institutional areas most studied, and therefore bring together the different conclusions 
about its significance for FDI. The initial focus of empirical studies on FDI was on 
economic determinants. Market size, degree of openness, cluster, proximity, level of 
industrialization, agglomeration economies, level of infrastructure, currency depreciation 
have a positive and significant relation with FDI. Contrary to taxes, labor costs and 
education, that demonstrates a negative impact on FDI. The most robust relation is with 
market size (Lim, 2001). However, the results are not consensual among several authors 
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concerning their impact on FDI. Chakrabarti (2001) argues that most factors of cross-
country FDI are sensitive statistically. 
The growing economic relationship between countries and agreements among themselves, 
triggered greater movement of goods, people, capital and services. It is in this context that 
the concern with the quality of institutions arises, as weighting factor of where to invest 
and as a competitive factor in attracting FDI. The majority of the empirical studies claim 
that the quality of institutions has a significant impact on FDI. Schneider and Frey (1985) 
were among the first empirical studies to present a negative impact of political instability 
on FDI. A more recent study states that government stability is extremely significant in 
order to catch FDI, as well as the absence of conflicts, tensions and the guarantee of 
democracy (Busse and Hefeker, 2007). Li and Resnick (2003) argue that democracy affects 
FDI positively, once it reinforces property rights. Aizenman and Spiegel (2002) set a 
positive relationship between property rights and FDI, claiming that strong enforcement of 
property rights increases the share of FDI in total investment. Lee and Mansfield (1996) 
present one of the first empirical studies about the relationship between a developing 
country's system of intellectual property protection and FDI, concluding that has influence 
in volume and in composition of FDI. FDI inflows are affected positively by a reliable 
legal system with less corruption (Asiedu, 2005). Campos and Kinoshita (2003) also state a 
positive and significant relation between rule of law and FDI.  
Nevertheless, some studies do not reach the same conclusions. Noorbakhsh, Paloni et al. 
(2001) do not find a significant effect of democracy and political risk on FDI. Government 
stability and bureaucratic quality do not have a significant relationship with FDI according 
to Kolstad and Tondel (2002). Jensen (2003) find that government reputation, 
expropriation, corruption, rule of law and bureaucratic quality have insignificants effects 
on FDI. 
The latter results question the significance of the institutional variables and therefore the 
robustness of the results. But this controversy may be due to problems with the sample 
used in the study and to measurement problems (inappropriate measures) (Blonigen, 2005). 
Studying quality of institutions makes more sense in developing countries, since they have 
large discrepancies between them and some of them a poor institutional quality. Thus, it is 
pertinent to analyze the different impacts on FDI. While the quality of institutions in 
developed countries presents more homogeneous (Blonigen, 2005). 
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3. FDI and the Institutional Determinations of Doing Business 
 
3.1. Research question 
 
The main questions we would like to answer in this work are if institutional indicators of 
Doing Business report explain the worldwide differences in attracting FDI; what is their 
relationship; which are the areas most significant in attracting FDI; and if the conclusions 
are the same between advanced economies and developing countries. 
 
3.2. Model description 
 
The importance of quality of institutions in affecting the FDI in a country can be verified 
through the empirical analysis that follows, which analyze the relationship between the 
institutional indicators of the international report of Doing Business and the inward FDI 
stock for each country. 
 
Consider the following panel data model: 
 
        ∑    
 
   
               
 
where the subscript   = 1, 2, …, N designates countries, the subscript t = 1, 2, …, T. The 
scalar   and vector  [k×1] are parameters to be estimated. And,     is an i.i.d. error term 
which is assumed normally distributed. 
For each country i,     corresponds to the observations of the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable     is the natural logarithm of inward FDI stocks. Most empirical 
studies in this area use the logarithm of FDI to evaluate the impacts in terms of elasticities 
or semi-elasticities, and because it provides a better fit. On the other hand the use of FDI 
stocks are preferable to flows in a way that they are less volatile, and more relevant to 
analyze the role of institutions. In fact stocks are based on past accumulated flows which 
permit that specific year investments not influenced as flows are (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet 
and Mayer, 2007). In this sense stocks constitutes a better measure to evaluate the 
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relevance of institutional variables of Doing Business in FDI. Finally FDI stocks 
eliminates the possibility of negative values, and as such increases the number of 
observations which may be estimated. 
The    represents the idiosyncratic effects, which catches all specific individual 
characteristics of the host country that are important to the amount of inward FDI. 
The world movement of FDI along years has a trend, but this pattern can suffer a regime 
shift. So we introduce time dummies in the present model, denoted by   . 
Column vector     [1×k] contains the observations of the k explanatory variables. The 
explanatory variable      is a set of indicators of institutional quality
9
 and economic control 
variables. Institutional indicators were chosen from Doing Business, the international 
report that we pretend to study. Control variables, are composed by the host country’s Log 
of Gross Domestic Product (in current USD), Log of Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(in current USD), Gross Domestic Product growth and Openness. GDP is used to catch the 
impact of market size of the host country. GDP per capita is a proxy to purchasing power 
of consumers and is a proxy of real wages too (Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer, 2007). 
GDP growth rate is a proxy for market growth (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). Market size and 
growth can be considered one of the reasons in catching or not new investors (Resmini, 
2000). Openness - the share of imports plus exports over GDP - measures the level of 
trade, meaning the degree of liberal trade regime (Resmini, 2000). Market size and trade 
openness seems to be the more robust determinants of FDI, as argued by Chakrabarti 
(2001) and Moosa and Cardak (2006) respectively.  
These were the chosen variables considered in the literature as the most relevant and 
robust. Moreover the objective of the present study is to concentrate the analysis on Doing 
Business’ institutional determinants. Doing Business’ database it is already ample, 
catching different institutional areas. 
 
3.3. Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on 177 countries, which 33 are advanced economies and 
144 are developing countries, covering 2004-2009 period. The choice of countries and also 
the period covered are determined by the availability of Doing Business’ data, UNCTAD’s 
data, WDI’s data and in according with classification of countries by FMI.  
                                                          
9
 Detailed description on data section and in appendix 1. 
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Concerning the purpose of this study, the principal database is Doing Business
10
. From the 
183 countries, 6 were eliminated. Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Puerto Rico and 
West Bank and Gaza are not classified by FMI as advanced economies or developing 
countries. Kosovo was excluded once there is no availability of economic variables.  
The dependent variable, inward FDI stocks, was obtained on UNCTAD database. All 
control variables, GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth and openness were obtained on 
World Development Indicators 2012. 
 
Table 1: Advanced and Developing Countries 
 
 
According with Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) the impact of GDP per capita is 
unclear. In general, studies show that its impact is positive on inward FDI, but not always 
significant. This happens once GDP per capita induces two distinct potential effects. 
Indeed, GDP per capita is a proxy to purchasing power of consumers and is a proxy of real 
wages too. GDP and GDP growth as proxies to market size and to market potential growth 
are a way to understand the product demand and the capacity to supply. Thus, we expect 
coefficients to be positive (Bevan and Estrin, 2004). These expected relationships are 
confirmed in correlation matrix
11
. FDI has a strong positive correlation with GDP and with 
GDP per capita. Relatively to openness variable, Bevan and Estrin (2004, p.778) claims 
that should be positively related with FDI. Since openness reveals the degree of trade 
liberalization, a higher degree attracts more multinational firms. 
                                                          
10
 Database obtained in Doing Business’ site: www.doingbusiness.org. 
11
 Table 2.1 in appendix 2. 
Advanced economies Developing economies
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan
Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States.
Republic of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire,
Croatia, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda,
Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste,
Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Republic of
Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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Concerning institutional variables of Doing Business’ report, it constitutes a vast set of 
information on business regulations, covering 9 different areas (33 variables) – Starting a 
business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. 
In order to easier interpretations and comparisons, the information of the 33 variables was 
summarized into these 9 categories. In a first step, all the 33 variables were transformed to 
indexes, through the min-max standardization method. At a second step these indexes were 
grouped in their respective categories. One great advantage is to provide a consistent 
measure for evaluating each area of institutional quality of potential host countries. All 
institutional indicators range from 0 to 10. Higher values always mean better 
performances. An important aspect to note is that each report of the Doing Business refer 
the facts of the previous year, thus the 2007 report for example refers to data from June 1, 
2006. The database of the present analysis already takes into account this situation, so the 
data on institutional variables reflect the exact year information. The empirical theory turns 
out that the quality of institutions positively influences the flow of FDI. So the expected 
relationship between FDI and institutional variables is positive. Correlation matrix (Table 
2.1 in appendix 2) demonstrates exactly that there is a relatively strong correlation between 
FDI and all categories of business regulations. 
 
Table 2: Abbreviations 
 
 
Abbreviation Description
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDPpc Gross Domestic Product per capita
GDPgrowth Gross Domestic Product growth rate
Openness Degree of Openness
Startbusi Starting a Business
Construct Dealing with construction permits
Property Registering a property
Credit Getting Credit
Investors Strength of investor protection
Taxes Paying Taxes
Trade Trading across borders
Contracts Enforcing contracts
Close Closing a Business
Global Simple average of the 9 institutional areas
17 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in benchmark
12
 
 
 
3.4. Estimation procedure 
 
The purpose of this empirical study is to explore the relationship between institutional 
indicators of Doing Business’ report and inward FDI stock.  
The appropriate estimation method to explore this relationship will depend on specific 
characteristics of countries, on the error term and on the independent variables, as well as 
on the relation between them (Rodríguez and Pallas, 2008). The estimations are carried out 
using the Stata/SE 10.0. There are some unobservable country-specific characteristics that 
lead to different nature of FDI and different amounts of inward FDI stock, which can cause 
problems of endogeneity (a common implication of using panel data). This means that each 
country has individual-specific effects time-invariant triggering correlation with regressors. 
And this is the key assumption that makes fixed-effects estimator necessary
13
. Concerning 
others estimators, for example first differences estimator is less efficient (in weak terms) 
than fixed effects and so in general it is not applied. In turn between estimator is only used 
in very specific situations and in contrast with fixed effects it is inconsistent if the fixed 
                                                          
12
 The variables are defined in appendix 1. 
13
 Cameron, A. and Trivedi, P. (2005). Microeconometrics, Methods and Apllications. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gdppc 1231 10356.39 16044.02 8700446 118218.80
gdpgrowth 1229 4488665 5246471 -41 46.50
gdp 1231 280000000000 1130000000000 93500000 14300000000000
openness 1159 0.93 0.52 0.22 4459112
fdi 1239 77600000000 267000000000 0 3600000000000
startbusi 1169 9048817 0.49 6249659 9999844
construct 867 8765996 0.67 4758733 9880703
property 1009 8002185 0.92 2780887 9800431
credit 950 306902 1898603 0 8541389
investors 872 4981737 1547974 1 9675
taxes 872 8339218 0.93 334421 9896508
trade 872 7416478 141693 2055012 952717
contracts 1163 6659497 1248758 0.39 9636438
close 1079 6284229 1564722 1805556 9782529
global 758 7004165 0.80 5101769 9061121
lngdp 1231 2378607 2370508 1835366 3029106
lngdppc 1231 8092422 1623244 446596 1168029
lnfdi 1220 2257902 2443434 1601642 2891109
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effects model is the true model. On the other hand, pooled ols does not determine a specific 
effect and then is inconsistent once the fixed effects model is appropriate. Finally, 
Hausman test
14
 leads us to choose fixed effects estimator as the consistent estimator, 
against random effects. Therefore, fixed effects model is the true model, fixed effects is 
consistent and random effects is inconsistent. Despite the fact that, random effects is 
always more efficient. The fixed-effects estimator assumes that explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous conditional on the unobservable term time-invariant. In order to ensure 
that the FE estimator is well behaved asymptotically, we need a standard rank condition on 
the matrix of time-demeaned explanatory variables: rank          = K. Consequently the 
fixed effects estimator can be shown to be unbiased conditional on explanatory variables. 
Towards the maximum efficiency possible of this estimator, a further assumption is 
needed. That is idiosyncratic errors to have a constant variance across time and to be 
serially uncorrelated
15
. The potential heterogeneity between countries suggests that we 
should estimate with robust standard deviations. 
Summarizing the 33 variables in 9 categories or by concentrating all 9 categories in only 
one variable called global, leads us to gain in robustness of the results. Nonetheless 
empirical literature argue that this type of aggregation has a great disadvantage, in sense 
that is too broad once correlations between institutional variables are high (Júlio, Pinheiro-
Alves and Tavares, 2011). 
Countries with different levels of development certainly have specific patterns of FDI, so it 
makes sense to run a regression to each group of countries, apart from the joint regression. 
In the case of the present analysis two groups, the advanced economies and the developing 
countries. This way we can have a first idea of the differences in the explanation of FDI in 
advanced economies and in developing countries.  
Probably the variance in attracting FDI is not the same for advanced economies and 
developing countries. Thus we are dealing with testing for differences in regression 
functions across groups. Interacting dummy variables with other independent variables is 
the tool to test these differences. Interaction dummies permit to test whether the attraction 
of FDI to advanced economies and to developing countries is described by the same 
regression model. Thus it is necessary to define a dummy that is equal to zero in the case 
of a developing country and equal to one in the case of an advanced economy. 
                                                          
14
 Hausman test in figures 3.25 and 3.26 on the appendix 3. 
15
 Chapter 10. Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
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To the case of interacting dummy variables, the model to be estimated is the following: 
 
             ∑    
 
   
                                          
                                                               
                                                       
                                                     
                                                     
                                                 
                                                  
              
 
It is a model where the intercept and all slopes can be different across the two groups. We 
are going to test the null hypothesis, i.e., if inward FDI stocks follows the same regression 
model for developing countries and for advanced economies, stated as: 
 
                                         
 
This is tested against the alternative: 
 
                                                
             
 
Lastly, the question is if FDI depends on institutional quality of the last period. Thus we 
are going to carry out a new estimation, in which the institutional variables are lagged one 
year. Indeed Bevan and Estrin (2004) argue that the process of deciding and realizing 
investments abroad is time consuming, i.e., FDI flows do not occur at the same time 
decisions have been made. Following this idea, if explanatory variables change such as 
institutional variables, FDI reacts but with a temporal lag. In conclusion, inward FDI 
stocks analyzed here could represent a decision made on past levels of institutional quality. 
Therefore it is worth to estimate the model with a one-year lag for the independent 
variables in the four cases (individual, all variables, global and interaction variables). 
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Consider the following panel data model in the lagged form of the base model: 
 
        ∑    
 
   
                              
 
Where      represents the control variables and the          the one-year lagged 
institutional variables. 
 
3.5. Results 
 
The econometric analysis was carried out in several stages. In the first stage, the model is 
estimated only with the economic variables (Column 1 of table 4). In the second stage, 
institutional dimension is added to the model by the global index (Column 2 of table 4) and 
in another stage by 9 institutional indexes (Column 3 of table 4). In the fourth stage, the 
objective is to relativize the results by the level of development (Table 6). Fifth stage 
presents the results of introducing interaction dummies variables (Table 7). Finally, in the 
sixth stage results of model in one-year lag are presented (Table 8). 
The following tables contain the results of estimations, which are all based on fixed-effects 
model for the reasons previously presented. On the various attempts to estimate the model, 
it was found that the time dummy variables reveal most of the time to be significant at the 
1% level.  
 
3.5.1. Economic determinants of FDI 
 
GDP is clearly statistically significant in attracting FDI, even when institutional variables 
are added the overall sign and significance does not reveal striking differences. The 
positive coefficient and its significance strengthen the theoretical hypothesis of GDP as a 
proxy for market size. According to column (1) of table 4, an increase of 1% in the GDP of 
a host country increases FDI in 0.9%. 
The effect of GDP per capita is in general insignificant and negative. Nevertheless, when 
estimating the model only with economic determinants, GDP per capita shows a significant 
impact on FDI. GDP per capita can be seen as a signal of real wages and as such labor 
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costs. In this sense a higher GDP per capita could mean an increase in labor costs, which 
constitutes a lower attractiveness of the host country. 
Unlike the GDP per capita, GDP growth reveals significance only when the regression 
includes the institutional variables. Furthermore its impact on FDI is positive only 
regressing with institutional variables too.  
Lastly, openness is also statistically insignificant in the first regression. In the following 
regressions with global and then with the all institutional variables, openness is generally 
significant and has positive sign, as expected. Taking in account the results of column (2) 
of table 4, an increase by 1 percentage point (p.p.) on the degree of openness, rise inward 
FDI stocks around 27%
16
. 
 
3.5.2. Institutional determinants of FDI 
 
The results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. The overall Doing Business index, global, 
demonstrates economically meaningful effect on FDI, given its statistical significance at 
1% and the positive coefficient. In fact, an increase in one point in the global index (in a 0-
10 scale) fosters inward FDI stocks around 47% (column (2) in table 4). This means that 
countries with high quality institutions that guarantee the protection of property rights 
constitute a focus in attracting FDI. Column (3) of Table 4 presents the results for the case 
that the global index is disaggregated in all 9 indexes respectively to their categories. This 
estimation provides a more specific analysis, showing which institutional area has a 
stronger and weaker impact on FDI. Specific analysis is enriched if we run a regression to 
each institutional variable individually. These results are presented in Table 5, and only the 
coefficients for the institutional indicators are presented once they are the focus of the 
analysis. The variables are arranged according to their increasing explanatory power of 
Log FDI (R
2
). The interpretation of the coefficients of the institutional variables now 
requires special attention, they cannot be interpreted in the same way as economic 
determinants. The impact on the variation of FDI comes from a range of 0 to 10 points.  
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 The marginal effects are interpreted using the formula exp( ̂   , where  ̂ is the estimated parameter. 
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Table 4: Regression Results 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Gdp 0.892*** 0.778** 0.555*
(0.248) (0.356) (0.311)
Ln Gdppc -0.443* -0.500 -0.331
(0.253) (0.342) (0.304)
Gdp growth -0.001 0.006* 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Openness 0.203 0.242** 0.267**
(0.129) (0.121) (0.115)
Institutional variables
Global 0.388***
(0.075)
Startbusi 0.276***
(0.086)
Construct -0.130**
(0.064)
Property 0.110***
(0.034)
Credit 0.023
(0.022)
Investors -0.050*
(0.027)
Taxes 0.111*
(0.064)
Trade 0.116***
(0.031)
Contracts -0.027
(0.094)
Close 0.082*
(0.050)
No. Of obs. 1143 709 709
R
2
within 0.6964 0.6912 0.7166
between 0.6632 0.6794 0.7588
overall 0.6690 0.7024 0.7645
Wald χ
2    
/   F F(10,963)=186.12 F(9,542)=117.56 F(17,534)=69.31
Note. The parentheses contain the robust standard errors. * Significance at the 10% level. ** 
Idem., 5%. * Idem., 1%. Coefficients for time dummies and constant are omitted.
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Crossing the joint estimation results in column 3 of Table 4 with those of the individual 
estimation of Table 5 we can draw some interesting aspects. Individual estimations report a 
positive effect on FDI by all institutional variables. However, protecting investors and 
construction permits are insignificant in explaining FDI. The most relevant factors (1% 
significance level), according to individual estimations, are starting a business, registering 
property and trading across borders. When all variables are estimated jointly, construction 
permits, protecting investors and enforcing contracts reveal a negative impact on FDI 
contrary to individual estimate. Furthermore, getting credit and enforcing contracts are no 
longer significant in attracting FDI. Even more interesting is the fact that construct permits 
and protecting investors become significant. However, the joint estimation reinforces the 
previous result with regard to the most relevant factors. 
 
Table 5: Regression results – individuals’ significance 
 
 
Thus the factors that most influence the level of inward FDI are, in particular, the number 
of procedures, the costs and the time required to start a business and to registry a property; 
and also the procedural requirements for exporting and importing. For instance, a one point 
increase on starting a business performance leads to an increase in FDI around 32%, 
according to joint estimation. If registering a property or trading across borders improves 
their performance in one point, FDI is fostered in 12%. These impacts are slightly different 
to the individual estimates. Also the number of taxes, time to pay taxes, total tax rate and 
time, cost and recovery rate to close a business represents a statistically contribution in 
explaining the variability of the FDI in both two previous estimations (around 12% and 9% 
(1) Rob.Stand.Errors R
2
Global 0.388*** (0.075) 0.7024
Contracts 0.342*** (0.104) 0.8250
Startbusi 0.270*** (0.053) 0.8069
Close 0.077* (0.042) 0.8021
Trade 0.136*** (0.032) 0.7773
Property 0.121*** (0.033) 0.7488
Credit 0.058** (0.024) 0.7487
Investors 0.014 (0.027) 0.7155
Construct 0.035 (0.072) 0.6854
Taxes 0.142** (0.064) 0.6821
*, ** and *** represent rejections at 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, 
respectively. Coefficients for control variables are omitted.
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respectively to the mentioned areas). With respect to getting credit and enforcing contracts, 
we can concluded that individually are important in the uptake of the FDI, however, when 
compared to remaining institutional areas are not so critical in the choice of location of 
investment.  
The Wald test proves all the significances of the institutional variables to both 
estimations.
17
 
 
3.5.3. Two separate regressions: 
 
The question that arises now is whether there are differences in explaining FDI by 
institutional variables of Doing Business when the host country is an advanced economy 
and when the host country is a developing country. In this sense, at a first step two distinct 
regressions are estimated. The results are presented in Table 6. 
A first conclusion that arises immediately is that the results presented above apply to 
developing countries. Both in terms of significance and in terms of coefficients 
conclusions remains relatively the same, except closing the business that is no longer 
statistically significant in the explanation of FDI. 
Concerning an advanced economy, in general none of institutional factors of Doing 
Business is relevant to inward FDI (Column (2) in Table 6). Column (3) presents the 
specific effect of institutional variables. Analyzing at this level of specification, starting a 
business is the only institutional area that condition catchment of FDI. The performance of 
institutions loses importance in the decision of investors, when the target country is an 
advanced economy. 
In terms of economic determinants, we can establish a pattern. In the case that target 
country it is a developing country, matters the potential of market growth and secondly its 
openness. Investment in an advanced economy will depend on the degree of openness, 
once it reveals the ability to trade of that country. 
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 Provided in the appendix 3.26 and 3.27. 
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Table 6: Regression results – Relativizing results by level of development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing Advanced Developing Advanced Developing Advanced
Ln Gdp 0.735*** 1.399 0.412 1.059 0.171 1.124
(0.275) (1.071) (0.391) (1.013) (0.367) (1.049)
Ln Gdppc -0.380 -0.649 -0.310 -0.192 -0.105 -0.284
(0.273) (1.081) (0.368) (0.997) (0.350) (1.075)
Gdp growth -0.001 -0.003 0.005* -0.005 0.006* -0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Openness 0.189 0.278* 0.307** 0.234 0.339** 0.305*
(0.146) (0.153) (0.144) (0.175) (0.135) (0.169)
Institutional variables
Global 0.393*** -0.250
(0.077) (0.177)
Startbusi 0.259*** 0.255**
(0.092) (0.100)
Construct -0.129 -0.011
(0.081) (0.085)
Property 0.111*** -0.020
(0.036) (0.068)
Credit 0.025 -0.036
(0.023) (0.069)
Investors -0.063** 0.134
(0.028) (0.089)
Taxes 0.122* -0.141
(0.064) (0.185)
Trade 0.142*** -0.104
(0.031) (0.066)
Contracts -0.015 -0.055
(0.111) (0.126)
Close 0.093 -0.022
(0.066) (0.038)
No. Of obs. 919 224 558 151 558 151
R
2
within 0.6952 0.7506 0.7007 0.7670 0.7333 0.7907
between 0.6085 0.7220 0.6562 0.7165 0.5299 0.7463
overall 0.6209 0.7171 0.6510 0.7157 0.4613 0.7523
Wald χ
2    
/   F F(10,771)=145.99 F(10,182)=78.65 F(9,423)=99.23 F(9,110)=36.35 F(17,415)=63.31 F(17,102)=28.25
Note. The parentheses contain the robust standard errors. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. * Idem., 1%. Coefficients for time dummies and 
constant are omitted.
                      (1)                      (2)                       (3)
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3.5.4. Interacting Dummy Variables 
 
The introduction of interacting dummy variables reveals the differences in regressions for 
both groups of countries. The results are presented in Table 7.  
Regarding the results of column (1) the contribution of global variable to FDI of 
developing countries is around 51%, at a significant level of 1%. The coefficient of 
“dummy_global” variable represents the difference of contribution of global institutional 
variable to FDI between developing countries and advanced economies. So the impact of 
global index in FDI of an advanced economy is equal to – 0.301 = 0.409 – 0.710, i.e., (-
30%). Computing the exact percentage, one point increase in general performance of 
institutions leads to a decrease in inward FDI stocks of advanced economy around 26%, 
and it is significant at 1%level. The difference between the two groups of countries in 
terms of attracting FDI is – 0.710, a difference significant at 1% level. So the first 
conclusion is that there is evidence that the contribution of global index to FDI it is not the 
same among developing countries and advanced economies. 
Detailing the results and the differences in institutional areas (column (2) in Table 7) we 
can achieve more conclusive ideas. The institutional determinants that have more 
explanatory power in attracting FDI to developing countries are starting a business, 
registering property, protecting investors, paying taxes and trading across borders. All 
institutional variables have different effects in contributing to FDI in advanced economies, 
relatively to the effects in developing countries. These differences are given by the 
coefficients of interaction variables. Nevertheless, they are not all statistically significant. 
Only two institutional areas present significant differences in the impact of FDI between 
the two groups of countries. The two significant (at 5% level) differences in attracting FDI 
to advanced economies, in relation to developing countries, are in contribution of 
protecting investors and trading across borders.  
The contribution of protecting investors to FDI of developing countries is around – 6%. On 
the other hand, FDI of advanced economy increase around 13% if protecting investors 
increase one point (difference from developing country about 20%). The difference in 
attracting FDI by an increase of one point in trading across borders, between the two 
groups, is about – 17%. It leads to a decrease of FDI in advanced economies around 5% 
and to foster inward FDI in developing countries in about 15%. 
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Table 7: Regression results – Interaction variables 
 
(1) (2)
Ln Gdp 0.616* 0.364
(0.351) (0.324)
Ln Gdppc -0.377 -0.180
(0.336) (0.315)
Gdp growth 0.005* 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003)
Openness 0.247** 0.281**
(0.120) (0.114)
Institutional variables
Global 0.409***
(0.074)
Startbusi 0.269***
(0.091)
Construct -0.127
(0.080)
Property 0.110***
(0.036)
Credit 0.030
(0.023)
Investors -0.061**
(0.028)
Taxes 0.126*
(0.064)
Trade 0.136***
(0.031)
Contracts -0.028
(0.112)
Close 0.086
(0.067)
dummy_Global -0.710***
(0.200)
dummy_Starbusi 0.031
(0.129)
dummy_Construct 0.016
(0.123)
dummy_Property -0.093
(0.101)
dummy_Credit -0.144
(0.094)
dummy_Investors 0.180**
(0.086)
dummy_Taxes -0.279
(0.194)
dummy_Trade -0.186**
(0.091)
dummy_Contracts -0.031
(0.161)
dummy_Close -0.011
(0.091)
No. Of obs. 709 709
R
2
within 0.6954 0.7265
between 0.0340 0.0454
overall 0.0361 0.0456
Wald χ
2    
/   F F(10,541)=109.26 F(26,525)=54.40
Note. The parentheses contain the robust standard errors. * Significance 
at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. * Idem., 1%. Coefficients for time 
dummies and constant are omitted.
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According to F statistic, null hypothesis is rejected with a p-value equal to zero to five 
decimal places,  
 
                                            
 
This means that advanced and developing countries do follow different explanatory 
models, relatively to the effect of Doing Business’ institutional variables in FDI. Even 
though a great number of interaction variables be insignificant at the 10% level. 
 
3.5.5. Lagged form of the base model 
 
Table 7 presents the results to the case that the dependent variable depends on one-year lag 
institutional variables. 
The results presented in column 1 of Table 7 tell us that in general the institutional quality 
of a country in the year preceding analysis explains the direction of inward FDI of the year 
analyzed. For instance, a one point increase in global variable leads to an increase in FDI 
around 29%, which is significant at 1% level. More specifically, starting a business and 
trading across borders are significant in explaining FDI based on preceding year. 
Moreover when the choice to invest in a country is based on information from the previous 
year, the factors that are always served are the GDP and GDP per capita. That is, it is 
considered at all times the size of the market as well as their labor costs.  
Nevertheless, the contemporaneous model is more robust, since it has a great explanatory 
power (R
2
). Indeed, almost of institutional areas of Doing Business have explanatory 
power to FDI, only in the case they are contemporaneous with FDI. This means that FDI 
depends more on contemporaneous institutional quality, then in previous conditions. 
In fact, concerning the period analyzed, the investment decision process is faster, second 
institutions record major changes and the access to information are larger and faster. So it 
is natural that the inward FDI is explained by contemporaneous institutional situation. 
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Table 8: Regression results – Lagged form 
 
  
(1) (2)
Ln Gdp 1.326*** 1.140***
(0.446) (0.383)
Ln Gdppc -0.917** -0.774**
(0.413) (0.355)
Gdp growth 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Openness 0.066 0.066
(0.117) (0.119)
Institutional variables
Global 0.253***
(0.090)
Startbusi 0.191**
(0.078)
Construct -0.098
(0.090)
Property 0.009
(0.037)
Credit 0.011
(0.025)
Investors -0.026
(0.035)
Taxes 0.078
(0.050)
Trade 0.081***
(0.031)
Contracts 0.127
(0.118)
Close 0.067
(0.041)
No. Of obs. 553 553
R
2
within 0.6100 0.6288
between 0.5498 0.6121
overall 0.5688 0.6349
Wald χ
2    
/   F F(8,393)=57.63 F(16,385)=32.03
Note. The parentheses contain the robust standard errors. * 
Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. * Idem., 1%. 
Coefficients for time dummies and constant are omitted.
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4. Conclusion 
 
This study plays an important role in improving the business environment, in institutional 
terms. Indeed, the growing importance of FDI as an engine of economic growth triggers by 
each country a greater concern for their business environment. Moreover empirical studies 
prevails the positive influence of a good institutional quality in the promotion of 
investment in general. In this context arises the international report of Doing Business as 
an instrument of evaluation and reform of business environment. However, there is no 
empirical literature showing a relationship between the indicators of Doing Business and 
inward FDI. The purpose of this study was to verify that relationship. In other words it was 
to analyze if the difference in functioning of the institutions among countries, based on the 
Doing Business’ indicators, explains the difference in levels of foreign direct investment 
between countries. Furthermore, see if this relationship was the same for advanced 
economies and developing countries. Finally, was to identify the areas whose focus should 
be higher, given their higher significance. 
This analysis covered 33 advanced economies and 144 developing countries to the 2004-
2009 periods. Overgrown 9 institutional areas of international report of Doing Business 
and the most important economic determinants of FDI. 
The first main conclusion is that in general, a country rated with a better business 
environment performance is likely to collect larger amounts of FDI. Under different model 
specifications and joining the most important determinants variables, institutions appear to 
have a great impact on FDI. Hence, institutional quality plays a robust role in determining 
FDI. 
In particular, all procedures required in order to start a business, to registry a property, to 
trade across borders, to close a business and to pay taxes are the institutional factors that 
most contribute on attracting FDI. 
The second major conclusion is that advanced and developing countries do not follow the 
same explanatory models. The institutions are important when the decision to invest is 
among developing countries. In case the host country is an advanced economy, 
institutional quality loses relevance in explaining inward FDI. In fact, the functioning of 
the institutions among advanced economies is very similar that investors meet other pull 
factors that distinguish the advanced economies, contrary to the developing countries. 
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The third insight we can draw from this study is that the international report of Doing 
Business is a good indicator of the ability to attract FDI to developing countries. Thus a 
useful tool for political reform. 
 
4.1. Policy implications 
 
The conclusions obtained of the relationship between institutional indicators of the 
business environment and the caught amount of FDI allows us to draw some guidelines for 
policy reform. Institutional areas that have greater significance in determining FDI are 
probably those whose reform will have a greatest impact in attracting a greater amount of 
FDI. They are starting a business, registering property, paying taxes, trading across borders 
and closing a business. 
Doing Business as an "observer" of the business environment of 183 countries, gathers all 
the operational practices of the institutions and the reforms carried out from year to year. 
Moreover publish it in its annual report, allowing all countries to know in detail the various 
business environments and the various policy reforms taken. Thus, many economies have 
the opportunity to learn from the experience of others. In this sense, the Doing Business 
provides a selection of good practices adopted worldwide in order to serve as a guide of 
reforming the functioning of the institutions for a better business environment. 
Based on the suggestions to good practice in the Doing Business report, we can outline 
policy recommendations by institutional area. Concerning the process of starting a 
Business, the good practices recommended are to reduce or eliminate the minimum capital 
requirement, create a single interface (or a one stop-shop), state a unique company 
identification (for example a ID card), online access to the execution of all procedures as 
well as information, easy access to forms. With respect to registry a property, the practices 
that should be taken are faster processes, more effective definition of terms, definition of 
transfer charges fixed, computerize the data about the encumbrances and availability of 
cadaster information online. Economies can follow good practices in paying taxes if it is 
allowed to self-assessment, to fill and pay taxes electronically and if there is one tax per 
tax base. In order to improve the institutional area of trading across borders, Doing 
Business suggests adopting electronic data interchange systems, to link agencies through 
an electronic single window, to use risk-based inspections, to raise the regional 
cooperation, to spark competition and to promote transparency. Resolving insolvency can 
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operate better if for example special insolvency departments are created in order to be 
specialized in these cases. Moreover is crucial to establish more efficient processes and 
greater transparency of the same. And finally guarantee the rights of creditors. 
 
4.2. Limitations and Suggestions for future research 
 
The insights obtained about the importance of institutional areas of the international report 
of Doing Business in the explanation of foreign direct investment are limited in the sense 
that may not be applied to one or another particular country, or even at the regional and 
local level. Each country and each region has its own characteristics that may possibly be 
more significant in explaining FDI. 
As a suggestion, would be very interesting restrict the analysis to developing countries, 
dividing them into zones such as: East Asia and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Sub -
Saharan Africa. Certainly that would be found different relationships of significance of the 
institutions of different business environments in attracting FDI. 
Would be equally important, to estimate the model of the present analysis in dynamic 
panel, taking into account the fact that institutions are potentially endogenous. Using 
difference GMM and system GMM estimators. 
Finally, the question that arises is the following: reforming institutional areas revealed as 
significant have great impact on FDI? It would be useful to evaluate institutional reform, 
for example to the specific case of Portugal. 
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6. Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Data description 
 
A.1 Economic variables 
The following variables are used. 
FDI stock (fdi): Unilateral inward foreign direct investment stocks in US Dollars at 
current prices. Source: UNCTADStat. 
GDP (gdp): Gross Domestic Product in current US Dollars at current prices. Source: 
World Bank (World Bank Indicators, World Development Indicators (WDI), April 
2012). 
GDP per capita (gdp pc): Gross Domestic Product per capita in current US Dollars. 
Source: World Bank (World Bank Indicators, World Development Indicators (WDI), 
April 2012). 
GDP growth (gdpgrowth): Real GDP growth rate (percentage) relative to the 
previous year. Source: World Bank (World Bank Indicators, World Development 
Indicators (WDI), April 2012). 
Openness (openness): Degree of openness, measured by the ratio of exports (current 
US Dollars) plus imports (current US Dollars) over GDP (current US Dollars). Source: 
World Bank (World Bank Indicators, World Development Indicators (WDI), April 
2012). 
 
A.2 Doing Business indicators 
 
The World Bank's Doing Business (DB) database measures the level of bureaucracy in 
a country with regard to doing business. Encompasses a set of 40 indicators, divided 
into the following 10 areas of analysis: starting a business, dealing with construction 
permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, 
paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. For 
this analysis we used 33 indicators, which were aggregated into nine indexes 
corresponding to the respective areas and ranging from 0 to 10. To compute these 
indexes, we proceeded as follows. First, each indicator has become an index, ranging 
from 0 to 10, according to the min-max standardization method, 
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     k = 10 
      k       min
      max       min
 
If higher factor values imply better performances (e.g., strength of legal rights, 
recovery rate when closing a business), or 
 
     k = 10 - 10 
      k       min
      max       min
 
If higher factor values imply worst performances (e.g., procedures, time, cost). 
This was done for 175 of 183 countries from DB database, selected for this analysis. 
According to this computation, all scores are organized such that higher values always 
mean better performances. Finally, the topic score is obtained by the simple average of 
all factors that compose that topic.  
An overall doing business index is created by taking the simple average of the 9 topics 
scores, the “global” variable. 
 
A.2.1 Starting a business (startbusi) 
The starting business index measures all procedures that are legally required for an 
entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. It 
includes the following variables: 
 
Procedures: Number of all interactions of the company founders with external parties 
in order to officially start operating a business. 
Time: Median number of calendar days that are necessary in practice to complete a 
procedure with minimum follow-up with government agencies and no extra payments. 
Cost: All official fees and fees for legal or professional services if such services are 
required by law in order to officially complete each procedure to start operating a 
business. It is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. 
Minimum Capital: Reflects the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a 
bank or with a notary before registration and up to 3 months following incorporation in 
order to start operating a business. It is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s 
income per capita. 
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A.2.2 Dealing with construction permits (construction) 
The dealing with construction permits index measures all procedures required for a 
business in the construction industry to build a standardized warehouse, and also the 
costs and time necessary to complete these procedures. It includes the following 
factors: 
 
Procedures: Number of interactions of the company’s employees or managers with 
external parties that are legally required for building a warehouse, for a business in the 
construction industry. 
Time: Median number of calendar days that is necessary to complete a required 
procedure. 
Cost: All fees associated with completing the procedures to legally build a warehouse. 
Cost is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. 
 
A.2.3 Registering property (property) 
The registering a property index records the full sequence of procedures necessary for a 
business man purchase a property from another business man and to transfer the 
property title to his name, as well as the associated costs and time. It includes the 
following factors: 
 
Procedures: Number of procedures that are legally or in practice required for a 
registering property. 
Time: Median duration, in calendar days, that property lawyers, notaries or registry 
officials indicate is necessary to complete a procedure for registering a property. 
Cost: All official fees required by law to complete each procedure in order to register a 
property. This variable is recorded as a percentage of the property value. 
 
A.2.4 Getting Credit (credit) 
The getting credit index measures the legal rights of borrowers and lenders with respect 
to secured transactions and the sharing of credit information. It includes the following 
factors: 
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Strength of legal rights: Index that measures the degree to which collateral and 
bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. 
It ranges from 0 to 10. 
Depth of credit information: Index that measures rules and practices affecting the 
coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public 
credit registry or a private credit bureau. It ranges from 0 to 6. 
Public registry coverage: Number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit 
registry with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years. It is 
measured as a percentage of adults aged 15 and above. 
Private bureau coverage: Number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau with information on their borrowing history from the past 5 years. It is 
measured as a percentage of adults aged 15 and above. 
 
A.2.5 Strength of investor protection (investors) 
The strength of investor protection index measures the strength of minority shareholder 
protections against directors misure of corporate assets for personal gain. It includes 
the following factors: 
 
Extent of disclosure: Index which assesses who can approve related-party transactions 
and the requirements for external and internal disclosure in case of related-party 
transactions. It ranges from 0 to 10. 
Extent of director liability: Index that measures the ability of shareholders to hold the 
interested party and the approving body liable in case of a prejudicial related-party 
transaction, the availability of legal remedies (damages, repayment of profits, fines, 
imprisonment and rescission of the transaction) and the ability of shareholders to sue. It 
ranges from 0 to 10. 
Ease of shareholder suits: Index that measures the documents and information 
available during trial and the access to internal corporate documents. It ranges from 0 
to 10. 
 
A.2.6 Paying taxes (taxes) 
The paying taxes index measures the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-
size company must pay in a given year as well as measures of the administrative 
burden of paying taxes and contributions. It includes the following factors: 
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Payments: Records the total number of taxes and contributions paid, including 
consumption taxes, as well as the method of payment, the frequency of payment, the 
frequency of filing and the number of agencies involved for this standardized case 
study company during the second year of operation. 
Time: Measures the hours per year taken by company to prepare, file and pay 3 major 
types of taxes and contributions: the corporate income tax, value added or sales tax, 
and labor taxes, including payroll taxes and social contributions. It includes the time 
spent to collect information and to calculate the amount payable. 
Total tax rate: Measures all taxes and contributions borne by the business in the 
second year of operation as a percentage of total profits. 
 
A.2.7 Trading across borders (trade) 
The trading across borders index measures procedural requirements associated with 
exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods by ocean transport. Such as the 
time, cost and all documents needed by the trader. It includes the following factors: 
 
Documents to export: Number of all documents required per shipment to export the 
goods, such as bank documents, customs clearance documents, port and terminal 
handling documents and transport documents. 
Documents to import: Number of all documents required per shipment to import the 
goods, such as bank documents, customs clearance documents, port and terminal 
handling documents and transport documents. 
Time to export: Time (in calendar days) for exporting a standardized cargo, it is to 
obtain all documents required for inland transport and handling, for customs clearance 
and inspections, and for port and terminal handling. 
Time to import: Time (in calendar days) for importing a standardized cargo, it is to 
obtain all documents required for inland transport and handling, for customs clearance 
and inspections, and for port and terminal handling. 
Cost to export: Measures all fees (in US dollars per container) associated with 
completing the procedures to export a standardized cargo. These include costs of all 
documentation, inland transport and handling, customs clearance and inspections and 
port and terminal handling (official costs only, no bribes). 
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Cost to import: Measures all fees (in US dollars per container) associated with 
completing the procedures to import a standardized cargo. These include costs of all 
documentation, inland transport and handling, customs clearance and inspections and 
port and terminal handling (official costs only, no bribes). 
 
A.2.8 Enforcing contracts (contracts) 
The enforcing contracts index measures the efficiency of the judicial system in 
resolving a commercial dispute. It includes the following factors: 
 
Procedures: Number of procedures resulting from a commercial dispute before the 
relevant court, required by law or commonly used in practice between the parties or 
between them and the judge or court officer. It comprises the steps to file and serve the 
case, steps for trial and judgment and steps necessary to enforce the judgment.  
Time: Number of calendar days, from the moment the lawsuit is filed on court until 
payment. It includes the necessary time to file and serve the case, the time for trial and 
obtaining judgment and the time to enforce the judgment. 
Cost: Measures three types of costs required to complete procedures: court costs, 
enforcement costs and average attorney fees. It is recorded as a percentage of the claim, 
assumed to be equivalent to 200% of income per capita. 
 
A.2.9 Closing a business (close) 
The closing a business index measures the time, cost and outcome of insolvency 
proceedings involving domestic entities. It includes the following variables: 
 
Time: Number of calendar days for creditors to recover their credit. 
Cost: Measures all fees and costs associated with resolving insolvency. It includes 
court fees, government levies and fees of insolvency administrations, auctioneers, 
assessors and lawyers. It is measured as a percentage of the debtor’s estate value. 
Recovery rate: Measures cents on the dollar recouped by creditors through 
reorganization, liquidation or debt enforcement proceedings, i.e., the present value of 
debt that can be recovered. 
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Appendix 2: 
 
Table 2.1: Covariance Matrix with respect to the variables of the present study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP pc GDP growth GDP Openness FDIstocks Startbusi Construct Property Credit Investors Taxes Trade Contracts Close Global
GDP pc 1.0000
GDP growth -0.2804 1.0000
GDP 0.3112 -0.1129 1.0000
Openness 0.2312 0.0151 -0.1757 1.0000
FDIstocks 0.4277 -0.1566 0.8844 0.0207 1.0000
Startbusi 0.4249 -0.2517 0.1001 0.2034 0.2212 1.0000
Construct 0.2907 -0.1638 0.0629 0.1222 0.1259 0.3162 1.0000
Property 0.3400 -0.1048 0.1673 0.1630 0.1751 0.3215 0.1450 1.0000
Credit 0.4929 -0.2534 0.3347 0.0716 0.4014 0.3440 0.2157 0.4512 1.0000
Investors 0.3213 -0.1371 0.2473 0.1971 0.3200 0.4817 0.2512 0.2455 0.4827 1.0000
Taxes 0.4366 -0.1433 0.1020 0.2173 0.1872 0.4275 0.2797 0.2866 0.2886 0.3608 1.0000
Trade 0.5153 -0.2786 0.2125 0.2166 0.2749 0.3908 0.2959 0.3543 0.5316 0.3847 0.3399 1.0000
Contracts 0.4677 -0.1747 0.2007 0.3027 0.3026 0.4150 0.0981 0.4390 0.4986 0.2438 0.2402 0.3163 1.0000
Close 0.6095 -0.2246 0.2706 0.1819 0.3672 0.5057 0.2996 0.3263 0.5463 0.4277 0.4461 0.5240 0.5092 1.0000
Global 0.6601 -0.2898 0.3201 0.2650 0.4282 0.6321 0.4187 0.5802 0.8052 0.6784 0.5737 0.7224 0.6402 0.7947 1.0000
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Appendix 3: 
 
Figure 3.1: Stata output of the simple regression for economic variables case 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Stata output of the developing countries regression for the economic 
variables case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .97013269   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .24672149
     sigma_u     1.406127
                                                                              
       _cons     4.486299   4.106389     1.09   0.275    -3.572203     12.5448
 _Iyear_2009     .6316716   .0661327     9.55   0.000     .5018909    .7614523
 _Iyear_2008       .45684   .0759762     6.01   0.000     .3077421     .605938
 _Iyear_2007     .4730337   .0614907     7.69   0.000     .3523624    .5937049
 _Iyear_2006     .3036052   .0481494     6.31   0.000     .2091154    .3980949
 _Iyear_2005     .1421254   .0398959     3.56   0.000     .0638325    .2204184
 _Iyear_2004      .091161   .0361036     2.52   0.012     .0203103    .1620118
    openness     .2029563   .1291241     1.57   0.116    -.0504407    .4563533
   gdpgrowth    -.0006219   .0029286    -0.21   0.832     -.006369    .0051253
     lngdppc    -.4429749   .2526443    -1.75   0.080    -.9387719     .052822
       lngdp     .8922859   .2483369     3.59   0.000      .404942     1.37963
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1414                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,963)          =    186.12
       overall = 0.6690                                        max =         7
       between = 0.6632                                        avg =       6.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.6964                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       170
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1143
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
                                                                              
         rho    .96024983   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .25879393
     sigma_u    1.2719695
                                                                              
       _cons     7.254625   4.549155     1.59   0.111    -1.675575    16.18482
 _Iyear_2009     .7335342   .0808097     9.08   0.000     .5749011    .8921674
 _Iyear_2008     .5628373    .089957     6.26   0.000     .3862475    .7394271
 _Iyear_2007      .528278   .0726987     7.27   0.000     .3855671    .6709889
 _Iyear_2006     .3498887   .0566464     6.18   0.000     .2386893    .4610881
 _Iyear_2005     .1810364   .0466288     3.88   0.000     .0895019    .2725709
 _Iyear_2004     .0991782   .0416197     2.38   0.017     .0174768    .1808796
    openness     .1891137   .1461458     1.29   0.196    -.0977771    .4760046
   gdpgrowth    -.0010604   .0030664    -0.35   0.730    -.0070799    .0049591
     lngdppc    -.3802597   .2734861    -1.39   0.165    -.9171254     .156606
       lngdp     .7352597   .2754229     2.67   0.008      .194592    1.275927
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1442                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,771)          =    145.99
       overall = 0.6209                                        max =         7
       between = 0.6085                                        avg =       6.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.6952                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       138
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       919
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness _Iyear_* if dummy==0, fe vce (robust)
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Figure 3.3: Stata output of the advanced economy regression for the economic 
variables case 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Stata output of the simple regression for the global variable case, with the 
Wald test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .97750267   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18006755
     sigma_u    1.1869405
                                                                              
       _cons    -5.214391   17.50632    -0.30   0.766    -39.75583    29.32705
 _Iyear_2009      .388379   .1044925     3.72   0.000     .1822065    .5945515
 _Iyear_2008     .1849004   .1289083     1.43   0.153    -.0694467    .4392474
 _Iyear_2007     .3617253   .0933168     3.88   0.000     .1776033    .5458472
 _Iyear_2006     .2032288    .078387     2.59   0.010     .0485647     .357893
 _Iyear_2005     .0355169   .0661615     0.54   0.592    -.0950252    .1660591
 _Iyear_2004     .0794957    .063877     1.24   0.215    -.0465391    .2055304
    openness     .2781022   .1527767     1.82   0.070    -.0233391    .5795434
   gdpgrowth    -.0002796   .0071954    -0.04   0.969    -.0144767    .0139175
     lngdppc    -.6493556   1.081244    -0.60   0.549    -2.782741    1.484029
       lngdp     1.399466   1.071315     1.31   0.193    -.7143285     3.51326
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7527                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,182)          =     78.65
       overall = 0.7171                                        max =         7
       between = 0.7220                                        avg =       7.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7506                         Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =        32
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       224
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness _Iyear_* if dummy==1, fe vce (robust)
. 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  1,   542) =   27.16
 ( 1)  global = 0
. test global = 0
                                                                              
         rho     .9819426   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18283033
     sigma_u    1.3482289
                                                                              
       _cons     5.585508   6.220308     0.90   0.370    -6.633357    17.80437
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1621238   .0289798    -5.59   0.000    -.2190502   -.1051974
 _Iyear_2007    -.1579125   .0343892    -4.59   0.000     -.225465   -.0903601
 _Iyear_2006    -.3349151   .0500571    -6.69   0.000    -.4332448   -.2365853
 _Iyear_2005    -.4889354   .0623126    -7.85   0.000    -.6113393   -.3665316
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
      global      .388399   .0745223     5.21   0.000      .242011     .534787
    openness     .2418479   .1208315     2.00   0.046     .0044925    .4792033
   gdpgrowth      .005523   .0031856     1.73   0.084    -.0007346    .0117805
     lngdppc    -.5000884    .342013    -1.46   0.144    -1.171922    .1717449
       lngdp     .7780838   .3555032     2.19   0.029     .0797508    1.476417
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.3431                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,542)           =    117.56
       overall = 0.7024                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6794                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6912                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness global _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
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Figure 3.5: Stata output of the developing countries regression for the global variable 
case, with the Wald test 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Stata output of the advanced economies regression for the global variable 
case, with the Wald test 
 
 
 
 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  1,   423) =   25.84
 ( 1)  global = 0
. test global = 0
                                                                              
         rho    .98113174   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .19100333
     sigma_u    1.3773321
                                                                              
       _cons     11.77178   6.817103     1.73   0.085    -1.627831     25.1714
 _Iyear_2009     .5997944   .0788154     7.61   0.000     .4448758     .754713
 _Iyear_2008     .4405238   .0779719     5.65   0.000     .2872631    .5937845
 _Iyear_2007     .3773573   .0528842     7.14   0.000     .2734087    .4813059
 _Iyear_2006     .1790623   .0351574     5.09   0.000     .1099573    .2481672
 _Iyear_2005    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
      global     .3926709   .0772451     5.08   0.000     .2408387     .544503
    openness     .3073963   .1442173     2.13   0.034     .0239246     .590868
   gdpgrowth     .0053698   .0032593     1.65   0.100    -.0010366    .0117762
     lngdppc    -.3095384   .3681128    -0.84   0.401    -1.033096    .4140197
       lngdp     .4118023    .391404     1.05   0.293    -.3575367    1.181141
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5725                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,423)           =     99.23
       overall = 0.6510                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6562                                        avg =       4.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.7007                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       126
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       558
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness global _Iyear_* if dummy==0, fe vce (robust)
. 
            Prob > F =    0.1598
       F(  1,   110) =    2.00
 ( 1)  global = 0
. test global=0
                                                                              
         rho     .9790734   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .12269557
     sigma_u    .83924196
                                                                              
       _cons     1.356587   17.29632     0.08   0.938    -32.92065    35.63383
 _Iyear_2009     .1374203   .0665312     2.07   0.041     .0055711    .2692696
 _Iyear_2008     -.054461   .0764467    -0.71   0.478    -.2059605    .0970385
 _Iyear_2007     .1436251   .0388983     3.69   0.000     .0665378    .2207125
 _Iyear_2006    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2005    -.1734006   .0461479    -3.76   0.000     -.264855   -.0819463
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
      global    -.2502515   .1768051    -1.42   0.160    -.6006377    .1001348
    openness     .2338616   .1748777     1.34   0.184    -.1127048    .5804281
   gdpgrowth    -.0047604   .0055593    -0.86   0.394    -.0157777    .0062568
     lngdppc    -.1917431   .9972222    -0.19   0.848    -2.168003    1.784517
       lngdp     1.058564   1.013258     1.04   0.298    -.9494751    3.066604
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4268                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,110)           =     36.35
       overall = 0.7157                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7165                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.7670                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =        32
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       151
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness global _Iyear_* if dummy==1, fe vce (robust)
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Figure 3.7: Stata output of interacting variables regression for the global variable case 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Stata output of Hausman test on interacting regression 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .99702412   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18176907
     sigma_u    3.3270938
                                                                              
       _cons     9.610408   6.216729     1.55   0.123    -2.601477    21.82229
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1636895   .0286698    -5.71   0.000    -.2200072   -.1073718
 _Iyear_2007    -.1683752   .0343567    -4.90   0.000     -.235864   -.1008864
 _Iyear_2006    -.3551693   .0500784    -7.09   0.000    -.4535412   -.2567974
 _Iyear_2005    -.5228017   .0634775    -8.24   0.000    -.6474943   -.3981091
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
dummy_global    -.7101278   .1996431    -3.56   0.000    -1.102299    -.317957
      global     .4086502   .0737577     5.54   0.000     .2637636    .5535368
    openness     .2473249   .1200337     2.06   0.040     .0115356    .4831141
   gdpgrowth     .0054704   .0031535     1.73   0.083    -.0007241    .0116649
     lngdppc    -.3773825   .3358136    -1.12   0.262    -1.037041    .2822759
       lngdp     .6158697    .351177     1.75   0.080    -.0739678    1.305707
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7474                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,541)          =    109.26
       overall = 0.0361                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0340                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6954                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness global dummy_global _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
. estimates store fix
                                                                              
         rho    .99702412   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18176907
     sigma_u    3.3270938
                                                                              
       _cons     9.610408   6.216729     1.55   0.123    -2.601477    21.82229
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1636895   .0286698    -5.71   0.000    -.2200072   -.1073718
 _Iyear_2007    -.1683752   .0343567    -4.90   0.000     -.235864   -.1008864
 _Iyear_2006    -.3551693   .0500784    -7.09   0.000    -.4535412   -.2567974
 _Iyear_2005    -.5228017   .0634775    -8.24   0.000    -.6474943   -.3981091
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
dummy_global    -.7101278   .1996431    -3.56   0.000    -1.102299    -.317957
      global     .4086502   .0737577     5.54   0.000     .2637636    .5535368
    openness     .2473249   .1200337     2.06   0.040     .0115356    .4831141
   gdpgrowth     .0054704   .0031535     1.73   0.083    -.0007241    .0116649
     lngdppc    -.3773825   .3358136    -1.12   0.262    -1.037041    .2822759
       lngdp     .6158697    .351177     1.75   0.080    -.0739678    1.305707
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7474                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,541)          =    109.26
       overall = 0.0361                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0340                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6954                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness global dummy_global _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
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Figure 3.9: Stata output of one year lag regression for global variable case 
 
 
 
. 
. estimates store rand
                                                                              
         rho    .94315744   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18176907
     sigma_u     .7404151
                                                                              
       _cons     1.183358   .9108792     1.30   0.194    -.6019327    2.968648
 _Iyear_2008    -.2305532   .0272961    -8.45   0.000    -.2840526   -.1770539
 _Iyear_2007    -.1475512   .0313094    -4.71   0.000    -.2089164    -.086186
 _Iyear_2006    -.2464161   .0350736    -7.03   0.000    -.3151591   -.1776731
 _Iyear_2005    -.3395131   .0386032    -8.79   0.000    -.4151739   -.2638522
dummy_global     .0627005   .0254797     2.46   0.014     .0127613    .1126397
      global     .3223632   .0657911     4.90   0.000      .193415    .4513115
    openness     .5960566   .0862896     6.91   0.000     .4269321     .765181
   gdpgrowth     .0022243   .0030804     0.72   0.470    -.0038131    .0082616
     lngdppc    -.0113713   .0644986    -0.18   0.860    -.1377862    .1150435
       lngdp      .792716   .0344174    23.03   0.000     .7252591     .860173
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(10)      =   2134.36
       overall = 0.8929                                        max =         5
       between = 0.8854                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6720                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       709
note: _Iyear_2009 dropped because of collinearity
note: _Iyear_2004 dropped because of collinearity
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness global dummy_global _Iyear_*, re vce (robust)
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0001
                          =       34.62
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 _Iyear_2008     -.1636895    -.2305532        .0668637        .0087681
 _Iyear_2007     -.1683752    -.1475512        -.020824        .0141458
 _Iyear_2006     -.3551693    -.2464161       -.1087532        .0357448
 _Iyear_2005     -.5228017    -.3395131       -.1832886        .0503904
dummy_global     -.7101278     .0627005       -.7728283        .1980105
      global      .4086502     .3223632         .086287        .0333425
    openness      .2473249     .5960566       -.3487317        .0834398
   gdpgrowth      .0054704     .0022243        .0032461         .000675
     lngdppc     -.3773825    -.0113713       -.3660112        .3295614
       lngdp      .6158697      .792716       -.1768463        .3494864
                                                                              
                    fix          rand        Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fix rand
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .99180098   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .15331652
     sigma_u    1.6862433
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.227856   7.828921    -0.41   0.680    -18.61966    12.16395
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1495673   .0253136    -5.91   0.000    -.1993343   -.0998003
 _Iyear_2007    -.1318092   .0380957    -3.46   0.001     -.206706   -.0569124
 _Iyear_2006    -.2851796    .058165    -4.90   0.000    -.3995332   -.1708261
 _Iyear_2005    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
         L1.     .2532489    .089917     2.82   0.005     .0764703    .4300275
      global  
    openness     .0658837   .1169151     0.56   0.573    -.1639736     .295741
   gdpgrowth     .0049339   .0037368     1.32   0.187    -.0024126    .0122804
     lngdppc    -.9165236   .4128166    -2.22   0.027    -1.728129   -.1049185
       lngdp     1.325891   .4455886     2.98   0.003     .4498552    2.201926
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3978                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(8,393)           =     57.63
       overall = 0.5688                                        max =         4
       between = 0.5498                                        avg =       3.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.6100                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       152
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       553
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness l.global _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
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Figure 3.10: Stata output of the simple regression for all institutional variables case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho     .9845413   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .17646288
     sigma_u    1.4082634
                                                                              
       _cons     8.102114   5.711635     1.42   0.157    -3.117915    19.32214
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1627992   .0281604    -5.78   0.000    -.2181181   -.1074804
 _Iyear_2007    -.1643285   .0357711    -4.59   0.000    -.2345979   -.0940591
 _Iyear_2006    -.3386278   .0499791    -6.78   0.000    -.4368075   -.2404482
 _Iyear_2005    -.4823729   .0608735    -7.92   0.000    -.6019539   -.3627919
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       close     .0816191   .0495814     1.65   0.100    -.0157795    .1790176
   contracts    -.0272653   .0937578    -0.29   0.771    -.2114445     .156914
       trade     .1161943   .0314096     3.70   0.000     .0544927    .1778959
       taxes     .1110093   .0638111     1.74   0.082    -.0143424    .2363609
   investors    -.0501206   .0268253    -1.87   0.062    -.1028168    .0025755
      credit      .023492   .0223296     1.05   0.293    -.0203726    .0673567
    property     .1098438    .033561     3.27   0.001     .0439161    .1757715
   construct     -.129887   .0640018    -2.03   0.043    -.2556132   -.0041608
   startbusi     .2761028   .0856616     3.22   0.001     .1078278    .4443779
    openness     .2672793   .1151052     2.32   0.021     .0411647     .493394
   gdpgrowth     .0061715   .0029984     2.06   0.040     .0002814    .0120617
     lngdppc     -.330692   .3038378    -1.09   0.277    -.9275559    .2661719
       lngdp     .5550813   .3110245     1.78   0.075    -.0559003    1.166063
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6177                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,534)          =     69.31
       overall = 0.7645                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7588                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.7166                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
> fe vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_*, 
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Figure 3.11: Stata output of the developing countries regression for all institutional 
variables case, with the Wald test 
 
 
 
. 
            Prob > F =    0.1562
       F(  1,   415) =    2.02
 ( 1)  close = 0
. test close =0
            Prob > F =    0.8914
       F(  1,   415) =    0.02
 ( 1)  contracts = 0
. test contracts =0
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  1,   415) =   21.22
 ( 1)  trade = 0
. test trade =0
            Prob > F =    0.0590
       F(  1,   415) =    3.58
 ( 1)  taxes = 0
. test  taxes =0
            Prob > F =    0.0232
       F(  1,   415) =    5.20
 ( 1)  investors = 0
. test investors =0
            Prob > F =    0.2659
       F(  1,   415) =    1.24
 ( 1)  credit = 0
. test  credit =0
            Prob > F =    0.0022
       F(  1,   415) =    9.46
 ( 1)  property = 0
. test property =0
            Prob > F =    0.1102
       F(  1,   415) =    2.56
 ( 1)  construct = 0
. test  construct =0
            Prob > F =    0.0050
       F(  1,   415) =    7.98
 ( 1)  startbusi = 0
. test startbusi=0
                                                                              
         rho      .986937   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18204249
     sigma_u    1.5823259
                                                                              
       _cons      14.2233   6.428238     2.21   0.027     1.587332    26.85926
 _Iyear_2009     .5811361   .0756282     7.68   0.000      .432474    .7297983
 _Iyear_2008     .4192108   .0737096     5.69   0.000       .27432    .5641015
 _Iyear_2007     .3493966    .049426     7.07   0.000     .2522401    .4465532
 _Iyear_2006     .1607499   .0335573     4.79   0.000     .0947863    .2267134
 _Iyear_2005    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       close     .0934939   .0658107     1.42   0.156      -.03587    .2228578
   contracts    -.0151534   .1109619    -0.14   0.891    -.2332707     .202964
       trade     .1423362   .0309002     4.61   0.000     .0815958    .2030766
       taxes     .1220127   .0644477     1.89   0.059    -.0046719    .2486973
   investors    -.0631321   .0276971    -2.28   0.023    -.1175762   -.0086879
      credit     .0253346   .0227389     1.11   0.266    -.0193632    .0700324
    property     .1108648   .0360362     3.08   0.002     .0400286    .1817009
   construct    -.1294865   .0808978    -1.60   0.110     -.288507     .029534
   startbusi     .2592356   .0917739     2.82   0.005      .078836    .4396351
    openness     .3391469   .1354617     2.50   0.013     .0728703    .6054236
   gdpgrowth     .0058722   .0030247     1.94   0.053    -.0000734    .0118177
     lngdppc    -.1049071   .3496675    -0.30   0.764    -.7922475    .5824333
       lngdp     .1712475   .3665804     0.47   0.641    -.5493384    .8918333
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4747                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,415)          =     63.31
       overall = 0.4613                                        max =         5
       between = 0.5299                                        avg =       4.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.7333                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       126
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       558
> f dummy==0, fe vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_* i
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Figure 3.12: Stata output of the advanced economies regression for all institutional 
variables case, with the Wald test 
 
 
 
. 
            Prob > F =    0.5592
       F(  1,   102) =    0.34
 ( 1)  close = 0
. test close =0
            Prob > F =    0.6628
       F(  1,   102) =    0.19
 ( 1)  contracts = 0
. test contracts =0
            Prob > F =    0.1186
       F(  1,   102) =    2.48
 ( 1)  trade = 0
. test trade =0
            Prob > F =    0.4476
       F(  1,   102) =    0.58
 ( 1)  taxes = 0
. test  taxes =0
            Prob > F =    0.1367
       F(  1,   102) =    2.25
 ( 1)  investors = 0
. test investors =0
            Prob > F =    0.6086
       F(  1,   102) =    0.26
 ( 1)  credit = 0
. test  credit =0
            Prob > F =    0.7714
       F(  1,   102) =    0.08
 ( 1)  property = 0
. test property =0
            Prob > F =    0.8998
       F(  1,   102) =    0.02
 ( 1)  construct = 0
. test  construct =0
            Prob > F =    0.0126
       F(  1,   102) =    6.45
 ( 1)  startbusi = 0
. test startbusi=0
                                                                              
         rho    .98041872   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .12075901
     sigma_u    .85448572
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.505451   18.44472    -0.08   0.935    -38.09046    35.07956
 _Iyear_2009     .1423572   .0750029     1.90   0.061    -.0064107     .291125
 _Iyear_2008     -.066476   .0774248    -0.86   0.393    -.2200478    .0870958
 _Iyear_2007     .1409023   .0397187     3.55   0.001     .0621205    .2196841
 _Iyear_2006    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2005    -.1625272    .046735    -3.48   0.001    -.2552258   -.0698286
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       close     -.022394   .0382162    -0.59   0.559    -.0981956    .0534076
   contracts    -.0550836   .1259753    -0.44   0.663     -.304955    .1947877
       trade    -.1040724   .0661141    -1.57   0.119    -.2352094    .0270646
       taxes    -.1411365   .1851237    -0.76   0.448    -.5083285    .2260555
   investors     .1339861   .0893273     1.50   0.137    -.0431943    .3111664
      credit    -.0356718   .0694387    -0.51   0.609    -.1734031    .1020595
    property    -.0197201   .0676922    -0.29   0.771    -.1539873    .1145472
   construct    -.0107236   .0849387    -0.13   0.900    -.1791991    .1577519
   startbusi     .2547362   .1003293     2.54   0.013     .0557335     .453739
    openness     .3052175   .1687162     1.81   0.073    -.0294303    .6398653
   gdpgrowth    -.0018367   .0060846    -0.30   0.763    -.0139055     .010232
     lngdppc    -.2835263   1.074874    -0.26   0.792    -2.415534    1.848481
       lngdp     1.123714    1.04944     1.07   0.287     -.957846    3.205273
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5243                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,102)          =     28.25
       overall = 0.7523                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7463                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.7907                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =        32
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       151
> f dummy==1, fe vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_* i
54 
 
Figure 3.13: Stata output of Hausman test on developing countries regression for all 
institutional variables 
 
 
 
. estimates store effectsfixed
                                                                              
         rho      .986937   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18204249
     sigma_u    1.5823259
                                                                              
       _cons      14.2233   6.428238     2.21   0.027     1.587332    26.85926
 _Iyear_2009     .5811361   .0756282     7.68   0.000      .432474    .7297983
 _Iyear_2008     .4192108   .0737096     5.69   0.000       .27432    .5641015
 _Iyear_2007     .3493966    .049426     7.07   0.000     .2522401    .4465532
 _Iyear_2006     .1607499   .0335573     4.79   0.000     .0947863    .2267134
 _Iyear_2005    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       close     .0934939   .0658107     1.42   0.156      -.03587    .2228578
   contracts    -.0151534   .1109619    -0.14   0.891    -.2332707     .202964
       trade     .1423362   .0309002     4.61   0.000     .0815958    .2030766
       taxes     .1220127   .0644477     1.89   0.059    -.0046719    .2486973
   investors    -.0631321   .0276971    -2.28   0.023    -.1175762   -.0086879
      credit     .0253346   .0227389     1.11   0.266    -.0193632    .0700324
    property     .1108648   .0360362     3.08   0.002     .0400286    .1817009
   construct    -.1294865   .0808978    -1.60   0.110     -.288507     .029534
   startbusi     .2592356   .0917739     2.82   0.005      .078836    .4396351
    openness     .3391469   .1354617     2.50   0.013     .0728703    .6054236
   gdpgrowth     .0058722   .0030247     1.94   0.053    -.0000734    .0118177
     lngdppc    -.1049071   .3496675    -0.30   0.764    -.7922475    .5824333
       lngdp     .1712475   .3665804     0.47   0.641    -.5493384    .8918333
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4747                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,415)          =     63.31
       overall = 0.4613                                        max =         5
       between = 0.5299                                        avg =       4.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.7333                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       126
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       558
> f dummy==0, fe vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_* i
. 
. estimates store effectsrandom
                                                                              
         rho    .94582437   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18204249
     sigma_u    .76063455
                                                                              
       _cons     .6257757   1.478486     0.42   0.672    -2.272003    3.523554
 _Iyear_2008    -.2233572   .0313321    -7.13   0.000    -.2847669   -.1619475
 _Iyear_2007    -.1886652   .0376012    -5.02   0.000    -.2623622   -.1149681
 _Iyear_2006    -.2684212   .0432189    -6.21   0.000    -.3531287   -.1837137
 _Iyear_2005    -.3374147   .0465427    -7.25   0.000    -.4286367   -.2461928
       close     .0836251   .0586258     1.43   0.154    -.0312793    .1985296
   contracts     .0555873   .0631709     0.88   0.379    -.0682254       .1794
       trade     .1611021   .0280932     5.73   0.000     .1060403    .2161639
       taxes     .0488482   .0593248     0.82   0.410    -.0674263    .1651227
   investors    -.0543056   .0238028    -2.28   0.023    -.1009583   -.0076529
      credit     .0300054   .0207447     1.45   0.148    -.0106534    .0706641
    property     .0722608     .03791     1.91   0.057    -.0020414     .146563
   construct    -.0949697     .06821    -1.39   0.164    -.2286588    .0387195
   startbusi     .1731777   .0884566     1.96   0.050     -.000194    .3465493
    openness      .678984   .1140001     5.96   0.000     .4555479    .9024202
   gdpgrowth     .0020075   .0032221     0.62   0.533    -.0043077    .0083226
     lngdppc     -.091953   .0666879    -1.38   0.168    -.2226589    .0387529
       lngdp     .7823213   .0384948    20.32   0.000     .7068729    .8577697
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(17)      =   1571.48
       overall = 0.8240                                        max =         5
       between = 0.8161                                        avg =       4.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.7056                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       126
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       558
note: _Iyear_2009 dropped because of collinearity
note: _Iyear_2004 dropped because of collinearity
> f dummy==0, re vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_* i
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Figure 3.14: Stata output of Hausman test on advanced economies regression for all 
institutional variables 
 
 
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       86.75
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 _Iyear_2008      .4192108    -.2233572         .642568        .0667189
 _Iyear_2007      .3493966    -.1886652        .5380618        .0320792
 _Iyear_2006      .1607499    -.2684212         .429171               .
       close      .0934939     .0836251        .0098688         .029901
   contracts     -.0151534     .0555873       -.0707407        .0912249
       trade      .1423362     .1611021       -.0187659        .0128682
       taxes      .1220127     .0488482        .0731645        .0251807
   investors     -.0631321    -.0543056       -.0088265        .0141618
      credit      .0253346     .0300054       -.0046707        .0093122
    property      .1108648     .0722608         .038604               .
   construct     -.1294865    -.0949697       -.0345168        .0434954
   startbusi      .2592356     .1731777        .0860579        .0244516
    openness      .3391469      .678984       -.3398371          .07317
   gdpgrowth      .0058722     .0020075        .0038647               .
     lngdppc     -.1049071     -.091953       -.0129541        .3432493
       lngdp      .1712475     .7823213       -.6110738        .3645536
                                                                              
                effectsfixed effectsran~m    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman effectsfixed effectsrandom
. 
. estimates store effectsfixe
                                                                              
         rho    .98041872   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .12075901
     sigma_u    .85448572
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.505451   18.44472    -0.08   0.935    -38.09046    35.07956
 _Iyear_2009     .1423572   .0750029     1.90   0.061    -.0064107     .291125
 _Iyear_2008     -.066476   .0774248    -0.86   0.393    -.2200478    .0870958
 _Iyear_2007     .1409023   .0397187     3.55   0.001     .0621205    .2196841
 _Iyear_2006    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2005    -.1625272    .046735    -3.48   0.001    -.2552258   -.0698286
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       close     -.022394   .0382162    -0.59   0.559    -.0981956    .0534076
   contracts    -.0550836   .1259753    -0.44   0.663     -.304955    .1947877
       trade    -.1040724   .0661141    -1.57   0.119    -.2352094    .0270646
       taxes    -.1411365   .1851237    -0.76   0.448    -.5083285    .2260555
   investors     .1339861   .0893273     1.50   0.137    -.0431943    .3111664
      credit    -.0356718   .0694387    -0.51   0.609    -.1734031    .1020595
    property    -.0197201   .0676922    -0.29   0.771    -.1539873    .1145472
   construct    -.0107236   .0849387    -0.13   0.900    -.1791991    .1577519
   startbusi     .2547362   .1003293     2.54   0.013     .0557335     .453739
    openness     .3052175   .1687162     1.81   0.073    -.0294303    .6398653
   gdpgrowth    -.0018367   .0060846    -0.30   0.763    -.0139055     .010232
     lngdppc    -.2835263   1.074874    -0.26   0.792    -2.415534    1.848481
       lngdp     1.123714    1.04944     1.07   0.287     -.957846    3.205273
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5243                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,102)          =     28.25
       overall = 0.7523                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7463                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.7907                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =        32
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       151
> f dummy==1, fe vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_* i
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. 
. estimates store effectsrando
                                                                              
         rho    .91312414   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .12075901
     sigma_u    .39150285
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.795243   2.312808    -0.78   0.438    -6.328263    2.737777
 _Iyear_2008    -.2359413   .0497643    -4.74   0.000    -.3334775   -.1384051
 _Iyear_2007     .0099575   .0617829     0.16   0.872    -.1111348    .1310498
 _Iyear_2006    -.1045899   .0565245    -1.85   0.064    -.2153759    .0061962
 _Iyear_2005     -.242632   .0608055    -3.99   0.000    -.3618087   -.1234554
       close    -.0464593   .0432074    -1.08   0.282    -.1311443    .0382257
   contracts     .0802152    .068685     1.17   0.243    -.0544049    .2148354
       trade    -.0920492   .0500796    -1.84   0.066    -.1902034     .006105
       taxes     .0173545   .1919715     0.09   0.928    -.3589026    .3936117
   investors     .0454504   .0429091     1.06   0.289    -.0386498    .1295507
      credit     -.036307   .0672561    -0.54   0.589    -.1681266    .0955126
    property    -.0168886   .0625602    -0.27   0.787    -.1395045    .1057272
   construct    -.0445174   .0951232    -0.47   0.640    -.2309554    .1419206
   startbusi     .3855402   .1724923     2.24   0.025     .0474614    .7236189
    openness     .5074892   .0980809     5.17   0.000     .3152541    .6997242
   gdpgrowth    -.0052982   .0052944    -1.00   0.317    -.0156749    .0050786
     lngdppc     .1522896   .2546278     0.60   0.550    -.3467717     .651351
       lngdp     .8547367   .0890429     9.60   0.000     .6802157    1.029258
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(17)      =    671.24
       overall = 0.8731                                        max =         5
       between = 0.8660                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.7777                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =        32
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       151
note: _Iyear_2009 dropped because of collinearity
note: _Iyear_2004 dropped because of collinearity
> f dummy==1, re vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close _Iyear_* i
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9950
                          =        5.14
                 chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 _Iyear_2008      -.066476    -.2359413        .1694653        .0593138
 _Iyear_2007      .1409023     .0099575        .1309448               .
 _Iyear_2005     -.1625272     -.242632        .0801048               .
       close      -.022394    -.0464593        .0240653               .
   contracts     -.0550836     .0802152       -.1352989        .1056037
       trade     -.1040724    -.0920492       -.0120232        .0431637
       taxes     -.1411365     .0173545        -.158491               .
   investors      .1339861     .0454504        .0885356        .0783466
      credit     -.0356718     -.036307        .0006352        .0172726
    property     -.0197201    -.0168886       -.0028314        .0258545
   construct     -.0107236    -.0445174        .0337938               .
   startbusi      .2547362     .3855402       -.1308039               .
    openness      .3052175     .5074892       -.2022717        .1372782
   gdpgrowth     -.0018367    -.0052982        .0034614        .0029986
     lngdppc     -.2835263     .1522896        -.435816        1.044279
       lngdp      1.123714     .8547367        .2689769        1.045656
                                                                              
                effectsfixe  effectsrando    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman effectsfixe effectsrando
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Figure 3.15: Stata output of interacting variables regression for all institutional 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .99653834   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .1748212
     sigma_u    2.9661905
                                                                              
       _cons     12.25071   5.864467     2.09   0.037      .730002    23.77141
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1677984   .0280505    -5.98   0.000    -.2229033   -.1126934
 _Iyear_2007    -.1798357   .0361305    -4.98   0.000    -.2508138   -.1088577
 _Iyear_2006    -.3616364   .0503712    -7.18   0.000    -.4605904   -.2626825
 _Iyear_2005    -.5182582   .0627908    -8.25   0.000    -.6416103    -.394906
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
 dummy_close    -.0108278   .0914194    -0.12   0.906    -.1904204    .1687649
dummy_cont~s    -.0306588   .1614742    -0.19   0.849    -.3478736    .2865561
 dummy_trade    -.1859656   .0914251    -2.03   0.042    -.3655696   -.0063616
 dummy_taxes     -.278684   .1942924    -1.43   0.152      -.66037     .103002
dummy_inve~s     .1798675   .0859396     2.09   0.037     .0110398    .3486951
dummy_credit    -.1439893   .0938856    -1.53   0.126    -.3284268    .0404483
dummy_prop~y    -.0928964   .1009352    -0.92   0.358    -.2911829    .1053902
dummy_cons~t     .0160487   .1226918     0.13   0.896    -.2249785    .2570759
dummy_star~i     .0314541   .1289939     0.24   0.807    -.2219535    .2848617
       close     .0862023   .0671561     1.28   0.200    -.0457254      .21813
   contracts    -.0283961   .1124608    -0.25   0.801    -.2493245    .1925324
       trade     .1356593   .0311806     4.35   0.000     .0744052    .1969133
       taxes     .1256355   .0643061     1.95   0.051    -.0006934    .2519644
   investors    -.0606938   .0280648    -2.16   0.031     -.115827   -.0055606
      credit     .0302039   .0229561     1.32   0.189    -.0148931    .0753009
    property     .1095541   .0358132     3.06   0.002     .0391994    .1799088
   construct    -.1266374   .0804442    -1.57   0.116    -.2846694    .0313946
   startbusi     .2690938   .0919434     2.93   0.004     .0884718    .4497159
    openness     .2810606   .1143898     2.46   0.014     .0563427    .5057785
   gdpgrowth     .0064554   .0029775     2.17   0.031     .0006062    .0123047
     lngdppc    -.1802197   .3146313    -0.57   0.567    -.7983108    .4378713
       lngdp     .3640787   .3239962     1.12   0.262    -.2724095    1.000567
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6694                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(26,525)          =     54.40
       overall = 0.0456                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0454                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.7265                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
> e vce (robust)
> rtbusi dummy_construct dummy_property dummy_credit dummy_investors dummy_taxes dummy_trade dummy_contracts dummy_close _Iyear_*, f
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness  startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close dummy_sta
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Figure 3.16: Stata output of one year lag regression for all institutional variables 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Stata output of the simple regression for starting a business variable and 
the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .98926627   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .15112625
     sigma_u    1.4508457
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.498303   6.952057    -0.22   0.829    -15.16706    12.17045
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1495164   .0254955    -5.86   0.000    -.1996442   -.0993886
 _Iyear_2007    -.1313511   .0385943    -3.40   0.001     -.207233   -.0554692
 _Iyear_2006    -.2837419   .0576904    -4.92   0.000    -.3971696   -.1703143
 _Iyear_2005    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
         L1.     .0674712   .0410488     1.64   0.101    -.0132368    .1481791
       close  
         L1.     .1266061    .117992     1.07   0.284    -.1053832    .3585955
   contracts  
         L1.     .0811319   .0314501     2.58   0.010     .0192965    .1429673
       trade  
         L1.     .0783997   .0501064     1.56   0.118    -.0201167    .1769161
       taxes  
         L1.    -.0258826   .0352021    -0.74   0.463    -.0950951    .0433299
   investors  
         L1.     .0109223   .0246359     0.44   0.658    -.0375156    .0593601
      credit  
         L1.     .0094652   .0370534     0.26   0.799    -.0633872    .0823176
    property  
         L1.    -.0981765   .0904522    -1.09   0.278    -.2760185    .0796656
   construct  
         L1.     .1913039   .0778358     2.46   0.014     .0382676    .3443403
   startbusi  
    openness     .0660375   .1194505     0.55   0.581    -.1688194    .3008945
   gdpgrowth     .0050171   .0037267     1.35   0.179    -.0023101    .0123444
     lngdppc    -.7736919   .3547319    -2.18   0.030    -1.471146   -.0762377
       lngdp      1.13986   .3828038     2.98   0.003     .3872121    1.892507
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1893                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(16,385)          =     32.03
       overall = 0.6349                                        max =         4
       between = 0.6121                                        avg =       3.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.6288                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       152
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       553
> l.close _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness l.startbusi l.construct l.property l.credit l.investors l.taxes l.trade l.contracts 
                                                                              
         rho    .97149435   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .23524182
     sigma_u    1.3733118
                                                                              
       _cons     6.446555   6.641089     0.97   0.332     -6.58723    19.48034
 _Iyear_2009     .5958951    .081693     7.29   0.000     .4355646    .7562256
 _Iyear_2008     .4134396   .0863463     4.79   0.000     .2439767    .5829026
 _Iyear_2007     .4389476   .0695309     6.31   0.000     .3024864    .5754087
 _Iyear_2006     .2740657   .0531269     5.16   0.000      .169799    .3783325
 _Iyear_2005     .1171631   .0433597     2.70   0.007     .0320656    .2022607
 _Iyear_2004     .0735038   .0379105     1.94   0.053    -.0008994    .1479069
   startbusi     .2701444   .0532928     5.07   0.000     .1655521    .3747367
    openness     .3779538   .1259251     3.00   0.003     .1308135    .6250942
   gdpgrowth     .0010984   .0031142     0.35   0.724    -.0050135    .0072102
     lngdppc    -.2165264   .3930818    -0.55   0.582    -.9879878     .554935
       lngdp      .624562   .4001423     1.56   0.119    -.1607563     1.40988
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6494                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,902)          =    170.32
       overall = 0.8069                                        max =         7
       between = 0.8035                                        avg =       6.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.7120                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       170
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1083
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness startbusi _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  1,   902) =   25.70
 ( 1)  startbusi = 0
. test startbusi=0
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Figure 3.18: Stata output of the simple regression for dealing with construction permits 
variable and the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Stata output of the simple regression for registering property variable and 
the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .98075174   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .19414021
     sigma_u    1.3857961
                                                                              
       _cons     4.799972   5.610881     0.86   0.393    -6.218802    15.81875
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1976178    .030107    -6.56   0.000    -.2567427    -.138493
 _Iyear_2007     -.189596   .0320912    -5.91   0.000    -.2526174   -.1265746
 _Iyear_2006    -.3600588   .0473031    -7.61   0.000    -.4529537   -.2671638
 _Iyear_2005    -.5205224   .0572885    -9.09   0.000    -.6330267    -.408018
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
   construct      .034947   .0718346     0.49   0.627    -.1061234    .1760175
    openness      .237125   .1310687     1.81   0.071    -.0202706    .4945206
   gdpgrowth     .0043072    .003044     1.41   0.158    -.0016707    .0102851
     lngdppc     -.439972   .3049331    -1.44   0.150    -1.038807    .1588625
       lngdp     .8904618   .3218648     2.77   0.006     .2583764    1.522547
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1669                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,616)           =    120.39
       overall = 0.6854                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6682                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.6718                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       168
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       793
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness construct _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.6268
       F(  1,   616) =    0.24
 ( 1)  construct = 0
. test construct=0
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .97451124   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .21922097
     sigma_u    1.3555051
                                                                              
       _cons     6.469159   5.651275     1.14   0.253    -4.624922    17.56324
 _Iyear_2009     .5683346   .0659669     8.62   0.000     .4388342     .697835
 _Iyear_2008     .3708313   .0719709     5.15   0.000     .2295444    .5121182
 _Iyear_2007     .3809072   .0537438     7.09   0.000     .2754021    .4864123
 _Iyear_2006     .2103458   .0383243     5.49   0.000     .1351109    .2855807
 _Iyear_2005     .0516498   .0340777     1.52   0.130    -.0152485    .1185481
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
    property      .120907   .0326033     3.71   0.000     .0569031    .1849109
    openness     .2957626   .1347922     2.19   0.029     .0311506    .5603746
   gdpgrowth     .0046707   .0033044     1.41   0.158    -.0018162    .0111577
     lngdppc     -.299754   .3353317    -0.89   0.372    -.9580473    .3585393
       lngdp     .7190143   .3380945     2.13   0.034     .0552974    1.382731
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4661                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,755)          =    148.88
       overall = 0.7488                                        max =         6
       between = 0.7388                                        avg =       5.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6855                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       169
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness property _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.0002
       F(  1,   755) =   13.75
 ( 1)  property = 0
. test property=0
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Figure 3.20: Stata output of the simple regression for getting credit variable and the 
respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21: Stata output of the simple regression for strength of investor protection 
variable and the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .97520482   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .21761786
     sigma_u     1.364768
                                                                              
       _cons      7.38439   5.931151     1.25   0.214    -4.260731    19.02951
 _Iyear_2009       .55186   .0666743     8.28   0.000     .4209527    .6827673
 _Iyear_2008     .3579555   .0751939     4.76   0.000      .210321    .5055901
 _Iyear_2007     .3638121   .0563015     6.46   0.000     .2532707    .4743536
 _Iyear_2006     .1893681    .040129     4.72   0.000     .1105796    .2681566
 _Iyear_2005     .0348576   .0366712     0.95   0.342     -.037142    .1068572
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
      credit      .057673   .0235414     2.45   0.015     .0114522    .1038938
    openness     .3337712   .1570001     2.13   0.034     .0255199    .6420225
   gdpgrowth     .0049278   .0032225     1.53   0.127    -.0013992    .0112548
     lngdppc    -.3413198   .3517345    -0.97   0.332    -1.031909    .3492698
       lngdp     .7264836   .3542444     2.05   0.041      .030966    1.422001
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4711                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(10,695)          =    123.34
       overall = 0.7487                                        max =         6
       between = 0.7292                                        avg =       5.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.6706                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       170
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       875
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness credit _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
. 
            Prob > F =    0.0145
       F(  1,   695) =    6.00
 ( 1)  credit = 0
. test credit=0
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .97980065   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .19471994
     sigma_u    1.3561591
                                                                              
       _cons     6.061269   5.656319     1.07   0.284    -5.046598    17.16913
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1962637   .0301331    -6.51   0.000    -.2554391   -.1370883
 _Iyear_2007    -.1878467   .0338821    -5.54   0.000    -.2543843   -.1213091
 _Iyear_2006    -.3573885   .0488064    -7.32   0.000    -.4532343   -.2615426
 _Iyear_2005    -.5177031   .0587308    -8.81   0.000    -.6330386   -.4023676
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
   investors     .0137033   .0272958     0.50   0.616    -.0399002    .0673067
    openness      .261186    .132555     1.97   0.049     .0008747    .5214972
   gdpgrowth     .0038242   .0030455     1.26   0.210    -.0021564    .0098049
     lngdppc    -.3736878   .3075828    -1.21   0.225    -.9777182    .2303426
       lngdp     .8239718    .326072     2.53   0.012     .1836324    1.464311
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2875                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,620)           =    118.60
       overall = 0.7155                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7006                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.6677                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       169
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       798
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness investors _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.6158
       F(  1,   620) =    0.25
 ( 1)  investors = 0
. test investors=0
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Figure 3.22: Stata output of the simple regression for paying taxes variable and the 
respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Stata output of the simple regression for trading across borders variable 
and the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .98116475   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .1932915
     sigma_u    1.3950764
                                                                              
       _cons     4.086834   5.737645     0.71   0.477    -7.180741    15.35441
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1921391   .0301219    -6.38   0.000    -.2512923   -.1329859
 _Iyear_2007    -.1808803   .0335078    -5.40   0.000    -.2466828   -.1150778
 _Iyear_2006    -.3513831    .048688    -7.22   0.000    -.4469964   -.2557698
 _Iyear_2005    -.5113846   .0589016    -8.68   0.000    -.6270553   -.3957139
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       taxes     .1421506   .0640191     2.22   0.027     .0164301    .2678711
    openness     .2605497   .1308042     1.99   0.047     .0036767    .5174228
   gdpgrowth      .004766   .0030482     1.56   0.118      -.00122     .010752
     lngdppc    -.4828161   .3096838    -1.56   0.119    -1.090972    .1253402
       lngdp     .8967038   .3238101     2.77   0.006     .2608062    1.532601
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1640                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,620)           =    120.17
       overall = 0.6821                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6648                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.6726                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       169
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       798
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness taxes _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.0267
       F(  1,   620) =    4.93
 ( 1)  taxes = 0
. test taxes=0
                                                                              
         rho    .97827536   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .19067842
     sigma_u    1.2795458
                                                                              
       _cons     6.675326   5.469393     1.22   0.223    -4.065455    17.41611
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1876642   .0291814    -6.43   0.000    -.2449705    -.130358
 _Iyear_2007    -.1907112   .0318683    -5.98   0.000    -.2532942   -.1281282
 _Iyear_2006    -.3517039   .0457509    -7.69   0.000    -.4415494   -.2618584
 _Iyear_2005    -.5032685   .0552875    -9.10   0.000    -.6118421    -.394695
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       trade     .1355078   .0316728     4.28   0.000     .0733088    .1977068
    openness     .2332668   .1264426     1.84   0.066    -.0150408    .4815745
   gdpgrowth     .0035622   .0029128     1.22   0.222    -.0021579    .0092822
     lngdppc    -.3150759   .3055962    -1.03   0.303    -.9152051    .2850533
       lngdp      .740255   .3183612     2.33   0.020      .115058    1.365452
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4518                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,620)           =    120.15
       overall = 0.7773                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7693                                        avg =       4.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.6814                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       169
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       798
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness trade _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  1,   620) =   18.30
 ( 1)  trade = 0
. test trade=0
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Figure 3.24: Stata output of the simple regression for enforcing contracts variable and 
the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Stata output of the simple regression for closing a business variable and 
the respective Wald test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .96668278   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .23398851
     sigma_u    1.2603818
                                                                              
       _cons     6.677604   7.068737     0.94   0.345    -7.195586    20.55079
 _Iyear_2009     .6321682   .0761694     8.30   0.000     .4826773    .7816592
 _Iyear_2008     .4446345   .0812094     5.48   0.000      .285252     .604017
 _Iyear_2007     .4561424    .065098     7.01   0.000     .3283804    .5839045
 _Iyear_2006     .2835859   .0502144     5.65   0.000     .1850344    .3821373
 _Iyear_2005     .1273024   .0416451     3.06   0.002     .0455693    .2090355
 _Iyear_2004     .0783081   .0368034     2.13   0.034     .0060774    .1505389
   contracts     .3415657   .1038917     3.29   0.001     .1376667    .5454648
    openness     .3244177   .1136437     2.85   0.004     .1013791    .5474563
   gdpgrowth     .0001939   .0031051     0.06   0.950    -.0059003     .006288
     lngdppc    -.1817235   .4289899    -0.42   0.672    -1.023664    .6602174
       lngdp     .6109753    .433512     1.41   0.159    -.2398407    1.461791
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6118                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,897)          =    167.90
       overall = 0.8250                                        max =         7
       between = 0.8174                                        avg =       6.3
R-sq:  within  = 0.7116                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       170
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1078
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness contracts _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.0010
       F(  1,   897) =   10.81
 ( 1)  contracts = 0
. test contracts=0
                                                                              
         rho    .96964102   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .23068538
     sigma_u    1.3037129
                                                                              
       _cons     8.209994     7.1774     1.14   0.253    -5.877535    22.29752
 _Iyear_2009      .649533   .0768133     8.46   0.000     .4987668    .8002992
 _Iyear_2008      .464908   .0824955     5.64   0.000      .302989    .6268269
 _Iyear_2007     .4728849   .0660432     7.16   0.000     .3432577    .6025121
 _Iyear_2006     .3039124    .050689     6.00   0.000      .204422    .4034028
 _Iyear_2005      .132995   .0421347     3.16   0.002     .0502947    .2156953
 _Iyear_2004      .087409   .0374051     2.34   0.020     .0139917    .1608264
       close     .0767326   .0420002     1.83   0.068    -.0057039     .159169
    openness     .3199786   .1111415     2.88   0.004     .1018342    .5381229
   gdpgrowth     .0000684   .0031738     0.02   0.983    -.0061609    .0062977
     lngdppc    -.2252813   .4325052    -0.52   0.603    -1.074186    .6236236
       lngdp     .6403778   .4363049     1.47   0.143    -.2159849    1.496741
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6203                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(11,849)          =    163.10
       overall = 0.8021                                        max =         7
       between = 0.7953                                        avg =       6.4
R-sq:  within  = 0.7128                         Obs per group: min =         2
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       159
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1019
. xtreg  lnfdi lngdp lngdppc gdpgrowth openness close _Iyear_*, fe vce (robust)
            Prob > F =    0.0681
       F(  1,   849) =    3.34
 ( 1)  close = 0
. test close=0
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Figure 3.26: Stata output of Hausman test to the simple regression of global variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. estimates store fixedeffects
                                                                              
         rho     .9819426   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18283033
     sigma_u    1.3482289
                                                                              
       _cons     5.585508   6.220308     0.90   0.370    -6.633357    17.80437
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1621238   .0289798    -5.59   0.000    -.2190502   -.1051974
 _Iyear_2007    -.1579125   .0343892    -4.59   0.000     -.225465   -.0903601
 _Iyear_2006    -.3349151   .0500571    -6.69   0.000    -.4332448   -.2365853
 _Iyear_2005    -.4889354   .0623126    -7.85   0.000    -.6113393   -.3665316
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
      global      .388399   .0745223     5.21   0.000      .242011     .534787
    openness     .2418479   .1208315     2.00   0.046     .0044925    .4792033
   gdpgrowth      .005523   .0031856     1.73   0.084    -.0007346    .0117805
     lngdppc    -.5000884    .342013    -1.46   0.144    -1.171922    .1717449
       lngdp     .7780838   .3555032     2.19   0.029     .0797508    1.476417
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.3431                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(9,542)           =    117.56
       overall = 0.7024                                        max =         5
       between = 0.6794                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6912                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc  gdpgrowth openness global _Iyear_*, fe vce(robust)
. 
. estimates store randomeffects
                                                                              
         rho    .94226069   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .18283033
     sigma_u    .73858073
                                                                              
       _cons     .1992956   .7043033     0.28   0.777    -1.181113    1.579705
 _Iyear_2008     -.236731    .027671    -8.56   0.000    -.2909653   -.1824968
 _Iyear_2007    -.1407893   .0310196    -4.54   0.000    -.2015866    -.079992
 _Iyear_2006    -.2276115   .0327849    -6.94   0.000    -.2918687   -.1633542
 _Iyear_2005    -.3108652   .0350741    -8.86   0.000    -.3796092   -.2421212
      global     .3452204   .0657021     5.25   0.000     .2164467    .4739942
    openness     .6403598   .0858763     7.46   0.000     .4720453    .8086743
   gdpgrowth     .0015753   .0030341     0.52   0.604    -.0043715    .0075221
     lngdppc     .0342632   .0573493     0.60   0.550    -.0781395    .1466658
       lngdp     .8132861    .032581    24.96   0.000     .7494285    .8771437
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =   1828.46
       overall = 0.8979                                        max =         5
       between = 0.8893                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6672                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       709
note: _Iyear_2009 dropped because of collinearity
note: _Iyear_2004 dropped because of collinearity
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc  gdpgrowth openness global _Iyear_*, re vce(robust)
. 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0586
                          =       16.42
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 _Iyear_2008     -.1621238     -.236731        .0746072        .0086104
 _Iyear_2007     -.1579125    -.1407893       -.0171232        .0148459
 _Iyear_2006     -.3349151    -.2276115       -.1073036        .0378268
 _Iyear_2005     -.4889354    -.3108652       -.1780702        .0515041
      global       .388399     .3452204        .0431785        .0351683
    openness      .2418479     .6403598       -.3985119         .085003
   gdpgrowth       .005523     .0015753        .0039477        .0009705
     lngdppc     -.5000884     .0342632       -.5343515        .3371705
       lngdp      .7780838     .8132861       -.0352024        .3540071
                                                                              
                fixedeffects randomeffe~s    Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixedeffects randomeffects
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Figure 3.27: Stata output of Hausman test to the simple regression with all institutional 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
. estimates store fixedeffect
                                                                              
         rho     .9845413   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .17646288
     sigma_u    1.4082634
                                                                              
       _cons     8.102114   5.711635     1.42   0.157    -3.117915    19.32214
 _Iyear_2009    (dropped)
 _Iyear_2008    -.1627992   .0281604    -5.78   0.000    -.2181181   -.1074804
 _Iyear_2007    -.1643285   .0357711    -4.59   0.000    -.2345979   -.0940591
 _Iyear_2006    -.3386278   .0499791    -6.78   0.000    -.4368075   -.2404482
 _Iyear_2005    -.4823729   .0608735    -7.92   0.000    -.6019539   -.3627919
 _Iyear_2004    (dropped)
       close     .0816191   .0495814     1.65   0.100    -.0157795    .1790176
   contracts    -.0272653   .0937578    -0.29   0.771    -.2114445     .156914
       trade     .1161943   .0314096     3.70   0.000     .0544927    .1778959
       taxes     .1110093   .0638111     1.74   0.082    -.0143424    .2363609
   investors    -.0501206   .0268253    -1.87   0.062    -.1028168    .0025755
      credit      .023492   .0223296     1.05   0.293    -.0203726    .0673567
    property     .1098438    .033561     3.27   0.001     .0439161    .1757715
   construct     -.129887   .0640018    -2.03   0.043    -.2556132   -.0041608
   startbusi     .2761028   .0856616     3.22   0.001     .1078278    .4443779
    openness     .2672793   .1151052     2.32   0.021     .0411647     .493394
   gdpgrowth     .0061715   .0029984     2.06   0.040     .0002814    .0120617
     lngdppc     -.330692   .3038378    -1.09   0.277    -.9275559    .2661719
       lngdp     .5550813   .3110245     1.78   0.075    -.0559003    1.166063
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6177                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(17,534)          =     69.31
       overall = 0.7645                                        max =         5
       between = 0.7588                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.7166                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       709
> , fe vce (robust)
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc  gdpgrowth openness  startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close  _Iyear_*
. 
. estimates store randoeffect
                                                                              
         rho    .94540391   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .17646288
     sigma_u    .73431312
                                                                              
       _cons    -.7347792   1.252439    -0.59   0.557    -3.189514    1.719955
 _Iyear_2008    -.2288106   .0268342    -8.53   0.000    -.2814046   -.1762165
 _Iyear_2007    -.1471594   .0330829    -4.45   0.000    -.2120008    -.082318
 _Iyear_2006    -.2306092   .0369213    -6.25   0.000    -.3029737   -.1582448
 _Iyear_2005     -.304107   .0376373    -8.08   0.000    -.3778748   -.2303392
       close     .0851721   .0437405     1.95   0.052    -.0005578     .170902
   contracts      .075974   .0553143     1.37   0.170      -.03244     .184388
       trade     .1384581   .0283923     4.88   0.000     .0828102    .1941059
       taxes     .0438146    .057687     0.76   0.448    -.0692497     .156879
   investors    -.0459049   .0228414    -2.01   0.044    -.0906732   -.0011366
      credit     .0230444   .0200373     1.15   0.250    -.0162279    .0623168
    property     .0576004   .0356512     1.62   0.106    -.0122745    .1274754
   construct    -.0736459   .0588224    -1.25   0.211    -.1889357     .041644
   startbusi     .2013778   .0825227     2.44   0.015     .0396363    .3631192
    openness     .6146443   .0836457     7.35   0.000     .4507017    .7785869
   gdpgrowth     .0015384   .0029485     0.52   0.602    -.0042406    .0073174
     lngdppc    -.0229028    .061241    -0.37   0.708    -.1429329    .0971273
       lngdp     .8092236   .0353045    22.92   0.000     .7400281    .8784191
                                                                              
       lnfdi        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on economy)
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(17)      =   2282.86
       overall = 0.8943                                        max =         5
       between = 0.8877                                        avg =       4.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.6920                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: economy                         Number of groups   =       158
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       709
note: _Iyear_2009 dropped because of collinearity
note: _Iyear_2004 dropped because of collinearity
> , re vce (robust)
. xtreg lnfdi lngdp lngdppc  gdpgrowth openness  startbusi construct property credit investors taxes trade contracts close  _Iyear_*
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                                        see suest for a generalized test
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test;
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic
                          =   -17.13    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these
                 chi2(17) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 _Iyear_2008     -.1627992    -.2288106        .0660113        .0085404
 _Iyear_2007     -.1643285    -.1471594       -.0171691        .0136049
 _Iyear_2006     -.3386278    -.2306092       -.1080186        .0336857
 _Iyear_2005     -.4823729     -.304107       -.1782659        .0478437
       close      .0816191     .0851721        -.003553         .023347
   contracts     -.0272653      .075974       -.1032392        .0757024
       trade      .1161943     .1384581       -.0222638        .0134329
       taxes      .1110093     .0438146        .0671946        .0272778
   investors     -.0501206    -.0459049       -.0042157        .0140666
      credit       .023492     .0230444        .0004476        .0098549
    property      .1098438     .0576004        .0522434               .
   construct      -.129887    -.0736459       -.0562411        .0252221
   startbusi      .2761028     .2013778        .0747251        .0229765
    openness      .2672793     .6146443        -.347365        .0790735
   gdpgrowth      .0061715     .0015384        .0046331        .0005447
     lngdppc      -.330692    -.0229028       -.3077892         .297602
       lngdp      .5550813     .8092236       -.2541424        .3090143
                                                                              
                fixedeffect  randoeffect     Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixedeffect randoeffect
